7 Things You Need to Know About: Torts (Lecture Slides)

Corey Ciocchetti 

University of Denver - Daniels College of Business - Department of Business Ethics & Legal Studies

November 14, 2015

Abstract:

These slides help explain the seven most important aspects of tort law. They include coverage of: intentional torts against persons and property, dignitary torts such as invasion of privacy, business torts such as fraud as well as negligence and strict liability. The idea is to make tort law understandable to the lay reader, undergraduate and graduate student and law student.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690854>. Acesso em: 04 dez. 2015.

The Pope's Encyclical and Climate Change Policy

Copiado de: . Acesso em: 30 nov. 2015.

Introduction to Symposium: The Pope's Encyclical and Climate Change Policy

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By: Tom Ginsburg | November 25, 2015 - 10:46am

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As the world prepares for the opening of the Paris Climate Change conference, AJIL Unbound is pleased to offer a set of reflections on Laudato Si’, Pope Francis’ Encyclical Letter On Care for Our Common Home.[1] Released in May 2015, it has generated much commentary and debate, both because of its contents and its source. Pope Francis is calling on the world to rethink the relationships among the economy, the environment and morality, and to develop a spiritually grounded ethic that will inform institutions. 

We have a wonderful and diverse set of authors to engage with the Encyclical. We begin with a philosophical perspective from Dale Jamieson, who characterizes the work as one of moral theology, rather than a political intervention.[2] He situates the Pope’s views within contemporary philosophy, and explains that what the Pope is hoping to do is to stimulate an ethical conversation on environment and development, rather than make a narrowly political intervention. 

Dan Bodansky takes a more practical view.[3] Any impact of the Encyclical, he argues, will likely have more to do with the person of the author than the novelty of the arguments, which draw on themes familiar from the environmental movement. And while agreeing that climate change is a moral issue, Bodansky warns that it is an economic and technological one too. Economic and technological tools may help us to address the problem, and should not be rejected out of hand.

Dinah Shelton points out that other religious traditions have environmental ethics as well, implying that there is potential for a grand coalition of moral thinkers on the question.[4] Complementing this demonstration of the compatibility of the Pope’s ideas with those of other faiths, Ileana Porras then situates the Encyclical within the tradition of Catholic social thought.[5] She shows how it is at the same time a radical document and one that fits squarely in its own religious tradition. Her perspective provides helpful framing for non-Catholic readers to understand the goals and idiom of the document and how it interacts with law. 

Lavanya Rajamani examines the Encyclical from the perspective of international environmental law, specifically the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities.[6] As she points out, the Papal Encyclical endorses two of the key underpinnings of the principle, namely that all states must contribute to resolving environmental problems, and that obligations are to be assigned based on capacity. Finally, Lincoln Davies examines the Encyclical from the perspective of U.S. energy law, which he characterizes as profoundly amoral.[7] Because law is biased toward endless generation and consumption, and because consumers cannot see the full impact of their choices, our legal regime contributes in a direct way toward the problems identified in the Encyclical. In this way, we move from the philosophical to the legal and institutional, suggesting directions for concrete reforms to address the problems the Pope so profoundly identifies.

 Tom Ginsburg is Deputy Dean, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf Research Scholar, and Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

 Cite as: Tom Ginsburg, Introduction to Symposium: The Pope’s Encyclical and Climate Change Policy, 109 AJIL Unbound 120 (2015).

The fifth meeting of the Working Group charged with preparing the Hague Judgments Convention

Copiado de: <http://conflictoflaws.net/>. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2015.

The report of the fifth meeting of the Working Group established by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to prepare proposals in connection with “a future instrument relating to recognition and enforcement of judgments, including jurisdictional filters” is now available through the Conference’s website (see here for an account of the previous meeting).

The Working Group proceeded on the basis that the Convention should: (a) be a complementary convention to the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 30 June 2005, currently in force for the EU and Mexico; (b) provide for recognition and enforcement of judgments from other contracting States that meet the requirements set out in a list of bases for recognition and enforcement; (c) set out the only grounds on which recognition and enforcement of such judgments may be refused; and (d) not prevent recognition and enforcement of judgments in a contracting State under national law or under other treaties, subject to one provision relating to exclusive bases for recognition and enforcement (covering matters in the fields of intellectual property rights and immovable property).

The proposed draft text of the Convention prepared by the Working Group is annexed to the report.

The Working Group recommended to the Council on General Affairs and Policy (which is expected to meet in March 2016) that the proposed draft text be submitted for consideration to a Special Commission “to be held, if possible, in June 2016″.

It also recommended that matters relating to direct jurisdiction (including exorbitant grounds and lis pendens) be considered by the Experts’ Group in charge of the Judgments Project “with a view to preparing an additional instrument”. In the Working Group’s view, the Experts’ Group “should meet soon after the Special Commission has drawn up a draft Convention”.

Islamic Human Rights Law: A Critical Evaluation of UIDHR & CDHRI in Context of UDHR

Abdul Azeez Maruf Olayemi 

Department of Shariah and Law, API, University of Malaya,

Abdul Majeed Hamzah Alabi 

Al-Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University

Ahmad Hidayah Buang 

University of Malaya (UM)

2015

JOURNAL OF ISLAM, LAW AND JUDICIARY VOLUME 1, ISSUE 3 2015, PP 27-36 ISSN 2411-4936 

Abstract:    

Human rights are undeniable natural rights that are indispensable for the upholding of human dignity and respect. In light of modern development, the importance of these entities in the life of the average human being has not just become essential, but necessary as a component for the functioning of modern society. The essential nature of such rights may be posited from the high place and importance such rights has commanded in modern society since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948. Although incorporated in the very spirit of Islam, codification of the laws on human rights as understood in Islam had gained importance in order to primarily address the deficiencies within the UDHR, in addition to providing a framework from wherein to work regarding human rights. In this vein, this paper discusses the background and application of the two modern codified international instruments on human rights in Islam. These are the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR), 1981, and Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), 1990. In conclusion, the paper recommends the adoption of the provisions of the CDHRI and UIDHR alongside the existing provisions within the UDHR in order to effectively bridge the lacuna and deficiency in the latter.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690355>. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2015.

The Evidentiary Practice of the World Court

H.E. Peter Tomka 

International Court of Justice

Vincent-Joël Proulx 

National University of Singapore's Faculty of Law
November 20, 2015
Juan Carlos Sainz-Borgo (ed), Liber Amicorum Gudmundur Eiriksson, San José, University for Peace Press, 2016, Forthcoming.  Abstract:
In this chapter, we canvass some key aspects of the evidentiary practice of the World Court, with particular emphasis on recent developments. Our ambition is to provide insight into both the Court’s jurisprudential pronouncements on important evidentiary matters, and its institutional culture and practice as regards the management and treatment of evidence. This chapter begins by mapping out the evidentiary framework governing the Court’s work, with reference to relevant provisions, before turning to the admissibility of evidence before the Court. Ultimately, this contribution recalls and explores select substantive pronouncements of the Court on matters of evidence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693558>. Acesso em: 23 nov. 2015.

L'activité du juge interne et les relations internationales de l'Etat

Justitia et Pace

Institut de Droit international

Session de Milan - 1993

L'activité du juge interne et les relations internationales de l'Etat

(Neuvième Commission, Rapporteur : M. Benedetto Conforti)

(Le texte français fait foi. Le texte anglais est une traduction)

L'Institut de Droit international,

Considérant que le droit international joue un rôle de plus en plus important dans les divers systèmes juridiques nationaux;

Considérant que, de ce fait, les juridictions nationales sont nécessairement amenées à statuer sur des questions dont la solution dépend de l'application de normes internationales;

Considérant qu'il appartient en principe au système juridique de chaque Etat de prévoir les moyens les plus appropriés pour assurer l'application du droit international au niveau national;

Considérant toutefois que, aux fins d'une application correcte du droit international au sein de chaque Etat selon les méthodes d'interprétation propres à ce droit, il convient de renforcer l'indépendance des juridictions nationales à l'égard du pouvoir exécutif et de favoriser une meilleure connaissance du droit international par ces mêmes juridictions;

Considérant que le renforcement du rôle joué par les juridictions nationales en matière d'application du droit international peut être facilité par l'élimination de certaines limitations parfois fixées à leur indépendance par les lois et la pratique;

Considérant qu'à cette fin il est opportun de faire des recommandations à suivre au sein des systèmes juridiques nationaux;

Notant que la présente Résolution ne vise pas la question de la primauté du droit international sur le droit interne,

Adopte la Résolution suivante:

Article premier

1. Les juridictions nationales devraient être habilitées par leur ordre juridique interne à interpréter et appliquer le droit international en toute indépendance.

2. Lorsqu'elles déterminent l'existence ou le contenu du droit international, soit à titre principal, soit à titre préalable ou incident, les juridictions nationales devraient disposer de la même liberté d'interprétation et d'application que pour d'autres règles juridiques, en s'inspirant des méthodes suivies par les tribunaux internationaux.

3. Rien ne devrait s'opposer à ce que les juridictions nationales sollicitent l'avis du pouvoir exécutif à condition que cette consultation soit dépourvue d'effets contraignants.

Article 2

Les juridictions nationales, appelées à juger une question liée à l'exercice du pouvoir exécutif, ne devraient pas refuser d'exercer leur compétence en raison de la nature politique de la question si cet exercice est soumis à une règle de droit international.

Article 3

1. Lorsqu'elles ont à appliquer une loi étrangère, les juridictions nationales devraient se reconnaître compétentes pour statuer sur la compatibilité de cette loi avec le droit international. Elles devraient refuser de donner effet à des actes publics étrangers qui enfreignent le droit international.

2. Aucune règle de droit international n'empêche les juridictions nationales d'agir comme indiqué ci-dessus.

Article 4

Lorsqu'elles déterminent l'existence ou le contenu du droit international coutumier, les juridictions nationales devraient tenir compte de l'évolution intervenue dans la pratique des Etats, dans la jurisprudence et dans la doctrine.

Article 5

1. Les juridictions nationales compétentes devraient pouvoir constater en toute indépendance l'existence, la modification ou la terminaison d'un traité dont il est allégué qu'il lie l'Etat du for.

2. Dans une affaire portée devant elles, les juridictions nationales devraient refuser d'appliquer un traité, en tout ou en partie, si elles estiment qu'il est à considérer, pour quelque raison que ce soit, comme non valable ou ayant pris fin, en tout ou en partie, même lorsque l'Etat du for ne l'a pas dénoncé.

3. Les juridictions nationales devraient pouvoir interpréter un traité en toute indépendance, en s'efforçant de l'interpréter comme le ferait une juridiction internationale et en évitant les interprétations qui seraient influencées par des intérêts nationaux.

Article 6

Les juridictions nationales devraient déterminer en toute indépendance l'existence ou le contenu de tout principe général de droit conformément à l'article 38, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, ainsi que des résolutions obligatoires des organisations internationales.

Article 7

1. Les juridictions nationales devraient avoir la possibilité de déférer au pouvoir exécutif, et notamment aux organes chargés de la politique étrangère, l'établissement de faits qui ont trait aux relations internationales de l'Etat du for ou d'autres Etats.

2. L'établissement de faits internationaux par le pouvoir exécutif devrait constituer une présomption simple de l'existence des faits eux-mêmes.

3. La qualification juridique des faits devrait relever du seul pouvoir judiciaire.

(7 septembre 1993)

Extraído de : <http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1993_mil_01_fr.PDF>. Acesso em 27 out. 2015.

L’enseignement du droit international privé et public

JUSTITIA ET PACE

INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Session de Strasbourg - 1997

L’enseignement du droit international privé et public

(Dixième Commission, Rapporteur : M. Ronald Macdonald)

(Le texte anglais fait foi, le texte français est une traduction)

L'Institut de Droit international,

Réaffirmant la Résolution adoptée à la Session d'Athènes, le 12 septembre 1979, sur l'enseignement du droit international;

Soulignant que le droit international affecte de plus en plus le contenu du droit national et qu'une connaissance du droit international est nécessaire pour s'acquitter d'un large éventail de responsabilités professionnelles au niveau national et des responsabilités qui incombent aux individus dans une société internationale caractérisée par une cohésion croissante;

Réaffirmant que, dans les conditions qui prédominent dans le monde actuel, l'enseignement du droit est incomplet s'il n'englobe pas les éléments fondamentaux du droit international, public et privé;

Notant que la communauté internationale évolue vers un système plus complexe dans lequel les acteurs non étatiques prennent une importance grandissante et que le droit international et les droits nationaux sont de plus en plus liés entre eux;

Soucieux d'adapter l'enseignement du droit international à l'évolution du système international ainsi qu'au rôle et aux intérêts des divers acteurs non étatiques, y compris les individus ;

Désirant contribuer aux efforts d'ensemble tendant à renforcer l'enseignement, l'étude, la diffusion et une compréhension plus large du droit international dans le cadre de la Décennie des Nations Unies pour le droit international en vue de la réalisation des buts fixés par la Résolution 44/23 de l'Assemblée générale du 17 novembre 1989;

I Recommande ce qui suit:

1. Chaque faculté ou institut de droit devrait offrir un enseignement de base consistant en un ou plusieurs cours de droit international public et privé. Le but de cet enseignement est de familiariser les étudiants avec les éléments fondamentaux du droit international public et privé et de fournir le point de départ d'une formation plus spécialisée, susceptible d'être acquise à des stades ultérieurs du processus éducatif.

2. L'obtention d'un diplôme de fin d'études dans les facultés ou instituts de droit ainsi que l'admission dans une profession juridique, dans la magistrature, ou dans le service diplomatique devrait être subordonnée à la sanction préalable d'un ou de plusieurs enseignements de base en droit international public et privé. Ces enseignements pourraient utilement comprendre les sujets visé à l'Annexe I.

3. Les facultés ou instituts de droit devraient offrir un éventail de cours et de séminaires facultatifs destinés à compléter l'enseignement général décrit au paragraphe 1. Les sujets qui pourraient être proposés à titre facultatif aux niveaux supérieurs de cet enseignement de droit international public et privé sont visés à l'Annexe II.

4. Lorsque deux cours distincts sont offerts en droit international public et privé, il est établi une corrélation et une coordination étroites entre eux.

5. Lorsque l'admission dans une profession juridique a lieu au moyen d'un examen professionnel, cet examen ou ces examens devraient comprendre des épreuves de droit international public et privé.

6. (1) Les programmes des facultés de sciences politiques et d'autres institutions universitaires similaires devraient comporter un enseignement de base en droit international public et privé.

(2) Les programmes des académies militaires et des institutions similaires de formation des officiers et sous-officiers devraient comporter, outre cet enseignement de matières générales, un cour portant sur le droit des conflits armés, y compris le droit international humanitaire. Les principales règles de ce droit devraient aussi faire partie de la formation de tous les membres des forces armées.

(3) Un effort spécial doit être fait pour dispenser dans les écoles secondaires une initiation au système juridique international.

II

Invite le Bureau à créer dans le cadre de l'Institut une Commission permanente chargée de faciliter la réalisation des objectifs de la présente Résolution. Une attention spéciale devrait être accordée à l'enseignement du droit international public et privé dans les pays en développement, y compris l'accès aux informations juridiques et la dotation nécessaire aux bibliothèques et centres de documentation.

(4 septembre 1997)

ANNEXE I

En droit international public, l'enseignement de base pourrait utilement comprendre les sujets suivants:

(i) L'histoire, la nature et la fonction du droit international.

(ii) Les sources du droit international.

(iii) Le droit des traités.

(iv) Les rapports entre le droit international public et le droit international privé.

(v) Les rapports entre le droit international et le droit national.

(vi) Les sujets du droit international, y compris l'individu.

(vii) Le droit du territoire terrestre, de la mer, de l'air et de l'espace.

(viii) Juridiction et immunités ; nationalité ; étrangers ; réfugiés.

(ix) Le droit international des droits de l'homme.

(x) La responsabilité des Etats.

(xi) Le règlement pacifique des différends.

(xii) L'emploi de la force et le système de sécurité collective des Nations Unies.

En droit international privé, l'enseignement de base pourrait utilement comprendre les sujets suivants:

(i) Les sources du droit international privé.

(ii) Les rapports entre le droit international privé et le droit international public.

(iii) Les principes de la compétence judiciaire.

(iv) La loi applicable (facteurs de rattachement, qualification, ordre public).

(v) La reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions judiciaires étrangères.

ANNEXE II

En droit international public, les sujets suivants, entre autres, pourraient être proposés à titre facultatif:

(i) Le droit des Nations Unies : principes, buts et pratiques.

(ii) Le droit des institutions internationales.

(iii) Le droit des relations diplomatiques et consulaires.

(iv) Le droit international du développement.

(v) Le droit international de l'environnement.

(vi) Le droit économique international.

(vii) Le droit pénal international.

(viii) Le droit international humanitaire.

(ix) Le droit international du travail.

(x) Le droit administratif international.

(xi) Le droit de l'utilisation et de la réglementation des ressources naturelles.

(xii) Le droit international du désarmement.

(xiii) Le droit international de la mer et le droit maritime international.

(xiv) Le droit international de l'intégration régionale.

(xv) Le droit de l'unification, de l'intégration et de l'harmonisation.

En droit international privé, les sujets suivants, entre autres, pourraient être proposés à titre facultatif:

(i) L'arbitrage international.

(ii) Les contrats internationaux.

(iii) Le droit international des sociétés.

(iv) La responsabilité délictuelle et quasi-délictuelle.

(v) Le droit international de la famille et de la succession.

Extraído de: <http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1997_str_01_fr.PDF>. Acesso em 27 out. 2015.

7 Things You Need to Know About: The American Court System (Lecture Slides)

Corey Ciocchetti 

University of Denver - Daniels College of Business - Department of Business Ethics & Legal Studies

October 11, 2015

Abstract:

These slides cover the most important aspects of the American Court System. They are designed to be used in a business law course.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2672688>. Acesso em: 23 out. 2015.

Contract Law: A Comparative Introduction, Chapter 1

Jan M. Smits 

Maastricht University Faculty of Law - Maastricht European Private Law Institute (M-EPLI)

2014

Contract Law: A Comparative Introduction, Chapter 1 (pp. 3-15), Edward Elgar Publishing 2014 

Abstract:

Over the last two hundred years or so, contract law has been mainly national in contents and outlook. This is reflected in the abundance of textbooks on the contract law of national jurisdictions. These textbooks introduce students to the national contract law of their own country in their own language. Next to these traditional books, there is an increasing number of texts available that offer a comparative, European or even global perspective on the law of contract – invariably designed to cater for the needs of students who are already familiar with the fundamentals of contract law. The book of which one chapter is presented here seeks to combine the two: it introduces students to the field of contract law by way of a comparative approach. It assumes that contract law is an international discipline that can be taught on basis of common principles and methods, just like economics, psychology or any other field of academic study. There are two reasons why this approach is adopted.

First, substantive law is no longer the exclusive product of the nation-state and introductory textbooks should reflect this. In particular in the context of the European Union, law is shaped as much by the national legislators and courts of the 28 member states as it is by the European legislature and the Court of Justice of the European Union. At a global scale, the role of private regulation and of the CISG is increasing, as is the potential for choice of the legal regime applicable to the contract. All this reduces the self-evidence of teaching contract law on basis of the intricacies of one national law alone. Most of today’s law students will spend their professional life in a world in which knowledge of only one jurisdiction is not enough.

Second, learning the law is as much about learning a method as it is about mastering the substantive law. It arguably is more important to learn to ‘think like a lawyer’ than it is to know about the details of a court case or a statute that is likely to change anyway. In a similar way as economists do not focus on the study of one particular economy but adopt a method of analysis (‘the economic approach’), law is ideally not regarded as a subject but as a method. In this view, students no longer study German, English or Polish contract law, but simply ‘contract law’ by applying the legal approach towards the questions they are confronted with. This does not mean that the details of, or differences between, various legal systems are not discussed. To the contrary: it is exactly by looking at these similarities and differences among jurisdictions that one learns that much of the law is about exploring and contrasting the implications of conflicting views of what is right. It is this approach of focusing on arguments and policies that is at the core of the book this sample chapter is taken from. National laws are presented as variations on common themes and as alternative ways of dealing with some common problem. This text thus caters to the needs of the international classroom.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2669692>. Acesso em: 23 out. 2015.

Supreme Court Denies Cert in Samantar v. Yousuf

By William Dodge

Thursday, March 12, 2015 at 1:00 PM

On Monday, the US Supreme Court denied certiorari in Samantar v. Yousuf, ending an attempt by the former Prime Minister of Somalia to claim that the torture and extrajudicial killing for which he admitted liability in US court were official acts entitled to immunity. At the end of the case, it is worth looking back at Samantar and considering its lessons — for plaintiffs, for defendants, and for the US government.

The torture and extrajudicial killings in question were committed by agents of the Somali government under Samantar’s command when he served as Defense Minister and Prime Minister of Somalia during the 1980s. Samantar fled Somalia in 1991 and moved to the United States in 1997. Some of his victims had moved to the United States too, and in 2004 they brought suit in federal district court under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act. In 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Samantar was not shielded from suit by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which covers only the immunities of foreign states. The Court remanded for the lower courts to consider whether Samantar was entitled to immunity under federal common law.

The State Department determined that Samantar was not entitled to foreign official immunity. The Fourth Circuit agreed but gave only substantial weight to the State Department’s determination, not the absolute deference the executive branch claimed. Rather, the Court of Appeals followed a long line of US decisions holding “that jus cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and therefore do not merit foreign official immunity.” As I have explained previously, that conclusion is correct not just as a matter of federal common law, but also as a matter of customary international law. Samantar petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The executive branch, disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, asked the Court to grant, vacate, and remand the case, but the Court chose simply to deny cert.

In the meantime, Samantar admitted in open court that he was liable for the torture and extrajudicial killing committed under his command. The district court entered final judgment, finding that Samantar had ordered the human rights violations, a determination that he did not challenge on appeal. Rather, Samantar argued that he should be immune from suit in US court based on his official acts, and he petitioned for certiorari again. The Court asked the Solicitor General for his views. I explained that it would be unwise for the State Department to change its determination that Samantar was not immune in light of his admitted liability for the human rights violations even if Somalia requested immunity. In the end, however, Somalia did not request immunity, the State Department stuck by its determination, and the Solicitor General recommended that the Court deny cert, which it has now done.

Now that the case is over, it is worth considering a few lessons Samantar holds for plaintiffs, defendants, and the U.S. government. For plaintiffs, the lessons are to choose your defendants carefully and be sure of your facts. One reason the plaintiffs in Samantar succeeded is because the defendant was a former foreign official entitled to conduct-based immunity only for official acts. Current heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers, by contrast, are entitled to status-based immunity for all their acts. Plaintiffs learned this the hard way in the Singh case when they filed suit against the sitting Prime Minister of India, leading to a predictable determination by the State Department that the defendant was entitled to head-of-state immunity, rather than waiting until the defendant left office. Plaintiffs must also plead in their complaints a facially plausible claim tying the defendant to the human rights violations, the sort of claim that would be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In the absence of such allegations, the State Department will presume that actions taken by a foreign government official exercising the powers of his office were official acts entitled to immunity.

For defendants, the lesson is to raise other grounds for dismissal before resorting to immunity. The case against Samantar had been pending for nearly seven years before the State Department made its determination with respect to immunity. After the Supreme Court’s 2010 Samantar decision, the State Department made great efforts to put a process for immunity determinations, but sometimes it still cannot make the determination in sufficient time for the parties or the court. Defendants who can move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service, forum non conveniens, or even inadequacy of the pleadings should make such motions before asking the State Department for a determination of immunity. Indeed, prior to passage of the FSIA in 1976, the department refused to make immunity determinations until such threshold questions had been resolved.

For the US government, there are at least two lessons. First, Samantar illustrates the need to continue to make reasonable immunity determinations. The government claims its determinations are entitled to absolute deference, but the Fourth Circuit did not give it such deference in Samantar and (as I have previously argued) the Supreme Court seems unlikely to endorse such deference when the question reaches the Court. If the State Department had reversed itself and determined that Samantar was entitled to immunity despite his admission of liability for torture and extrajudicial killing, the courts’ willingness to defer would certainly have been tested. Second, Samantar suggests that the executive branch should consider getting out of the immunity business altogether. State Department discretion over immunity determinations is a poisoned chalice — it invites pressure from foreign governments to influence the decision and provokes diplomatic backlash if the State Department does not accede to that pressure. As former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger has noted, similar dynamics forty years ago led to the FSIA, which shifted state immunity decisions from the executive to the courts, benefiting both the rule of law and the United States’ foreign relations. The sooner the executive branch puts down this new chalice, the better.

Copiado de Just Security - Disponível em: https://www.justsecurity.org/21025/scotus-denies-cert-samantar/. Acesso em: 19 out. 2015.

Samantar v. Yousuf: What Happens Next?

By William Dodge

Thursday, October 23, 2014 at 8:50 AM

As Beth Van Schaack reported last week, the Supreme Court has called for the views of the Solicitor General in Samantar v. Yousuf, a case raising questions about the immunity of a former foreign official from liability for torture and extrajudicial killing. Samantar was once Defense Minister and then Prime Minister of Somalia, where he was responsible for serious violations of human rights. He has lived in the United States since 1997. Some of Samantar’s victims also fled to the United States, and in 2004 they sued him in U.S. district court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Their claims are not mere allegations. In 2012, Samantar openly admitted liability for torture and extrajudicial killing, and the district court found that “Samantar not only knew about” the human rights violations “but he in fact ordered and affirmatively permitted such violations.”

The stakes are high. The Supreme Court has been chipping away at the ability of human rights victims to find redress in U.S. courts. Foreign corporations are largely shielded from personal jurisdiction with respect to human rights abuses abroad after the Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. All corporations are exempt from claims under the TVPA for torture and extrajudicial killing following Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority in 2012. And the future of human rights suits against U.S. corporations under the ATS depends on how lower courts interpret the cryptic last paragraph of Chief Justice Roberts’s 2013 opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Kiobel left the door open to human rights claims against individuals under the ATS of the type brought in the landmark 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and the TVPA provides an express cause of action against individuals for torture and extrajudicial killing under color of foreign law. But doctrines of foreign official immunity could extinguish such claims, leaving the victims of human rights violations no recourse in U.S. courts even when, as in Samantar, both the victims and the perpetrator are longstanding residents of the United States.

One might think the Supreme Court has had quite enough of the tangled history of Samantar’s case. As Beth noted, this is the third time Samantar has asked the Supreme Court for review. The first time, in 2010, the Court unanimously rejected his argument that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) shielded him from suit. The Court held that the immunity of foreign officials in U.S. courts was governed not by the FSIA but by federal common law. On remand to the district court, the State Department determined in 2011 that Samantar was not entitled to immunity, citing in particular the lack of a recognized government in Somalia and the fact that Samantar was a U.S. resident who “ordinarily should be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, particularly when sued by U.S. residents.”

On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit held (1) that State Department determinations of the conduct-based immunity of former officials are entitled to “substantial weight” and (2) that foreign officials are not entitled to conduct-based immunity for violations of jus cogens norms (norms like those against torture and extrajudicial killing from which international law allows no departure). When Samantar sought Supreme Court review a second time, the Solicitor General filed a brief arguing that State Department determinations are entitled to absolute deference, not just substantial weight, and that there is no exception to immunity for jus cogens violations. The Solicitor General did not ask the Court to hear the case but rather to grant, vacate, and remand, noting that the United States had now recognized a government in Somalia and that the State Department might revisit its determination that Samantar is not immune. The Supreme Court did not follow the Solicitor General’s suggestion, however, and denied cert. Now, following the entry of final judgment, Samantar has sought review a third time. What happens next?

Will the State Department Issue a New Immunity Determination?

The Justice Department takes the position that determinations of immunity remain binding on U.S. courts until they are changed by the State Department. So the first question is whether the State Department will, in fact, revisit its 2011 determination that Samantar was not immune from suit. There are a number of reasons to think that it will not.

First, although the United States now officially recognizes a government in Somalia, Somalia’s position with respect to Samantar’s immunity remains unclear. Responding to contradictory letters around the time of Samantar’s second cert petition, the Solicitor General told the Supreme Court in a letter dated January 8, 2014 that “further diplomatic discussions” were needed “to clarify the position of the Government of Somalia on the immunity issue.” In April, the Justice Department told the district court in a related case that because of the security situation in Somalia, those discussions had not occurred. See Statement of Interest, Doe v. Ali (E.D. Va.) (filed Apr. 24, 2014).

Second, even if Somalia were to make a clear request to grant Samantar immunity, the State Department should be reluctant to change its position under pressure. The Department has said that it will consider a foreign government’s request for immunity but is not bound by it. See, e.g., Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity at 9, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Notwithstanding such a request, however, the Department of State could determine that a foreign official is not entitled to immunity.”). But changing a determination of immunity based on the request of a foreign government—particularly after a prior determination of non-immunity with respect to the same person—would make it seem that immunity determinations are based entirely on political factors. It would invite greater pressure from more powerful foreign governments in the future. As former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger has pointed out, this was the U.S. experience with respect to foreign state immunity prior to the FSIA, and it was not a happy one. Indeed, concerns about politicization of Executive Branch immunity determinations helped drive the move to codify foreign state immunity in the United States.

Third, even if recognition of a Somali government has affected one of the factors cited in the State Department’s 2011 determination, the other factor cited remains the same. Both Samantar and his victims continue to be residents of the United States who should ordinarily be able to turn to U.S. courts to resolve legal disputes. There remains no possibility that Somali courts could provide an alternative forum for the plaintiffs’ claims.

Fourth, another factor has changed since 2011 in a way that reinforces the State Department’s original determination of non-immunity. In 2012, Samantar admitted in open court his liability for torture and extrajudicial killing. The district court later entered final judgment finding on the basis of the evidence presented that “Samantar not only knew about” the human rights violations “but he in fact ordered and affirmatively permitted such violations,” findings that Samantar did not challenge on appeal. This therefore is not a case like Rosenberg (the Mumbai bombing case), in which the plaintiffs have made only conclusory allegations linking a foreign official to human rights violations. The facts in Samantar are undisputed: the defendant is legally responsible for the torture and extrajudicial killings suffered by plaintiffs.

Finally, and relatedly, to revisit the determination with respect to immunity in this case would not shield the defendant from the vexation of having to defend against an ill-founded lawsuit. Final judgment has already been entered after 10 years of litigation. A determination that Samantar is immune would, at this point, serve only one purpose—to absolve an admitted human rights violator and U.S. resident of legal liability for torture and extrajudicial killing, leaving his U.S.-resident victims without relief. How could such an action possibly be reconciled with the White House’s stated resolve to “hold accountable perpetrators of mass atrocities”?

If the State Department were to change its determination and find that Samantar is now entitled to immunity, the proper disposition by the Supreme Court would be a remand to the district court so that it could give “substantial weight” to that new determination under controlling Fourth Circuit precedent. But for the reasons noted above, such a change seems unwarranted and unlikely. It is hard to believe that the State Department would want to grant immunity to an admitted human rights violator, after ten years of litigation and the entry of final judgment, when the only possible explanation for the change would be political pressure from a foreign government.

If the State Department Does Not Change Its Determination, Is the Case Certworthy?

So what happens if the State Department does not change its determination? Is the case worthy of Supreme Court review?

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that Justice Kagan would be recused because of her prior participation as Solicitor General. That means the questions would be determined by less than a full Court, with an increased likelihood of a 4-4 split.

More importantly, despite the claims of Samantar’s lawyers, there is no split among the circuits on the question whether torture and other jus cogens violations may constitute official acts for purposes of conduct-based immunity. The supposedly contrary decisions cited in Samantar’s petition have in fact addressed the separate question of whether to recognize a jus cogens exception to immunity once that immunity has attached. As D.C. Circuit Judge Stephen Williams has aptly noted, the question whether an immunity attaches is “quite distinct” from the question whether to recognize exceptions to an existing immunity. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Williams, J., concurring).

There is a weak and shallow split among the circuits on a second question: the level of deference to give State Department determinations of conduct-based immunity. The Second Circuit gives such determinations absolute deference, while the Fourth Circuit gives them “substantial weight.” Resolution of that split would not affect the outcome of this case, however, because the Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the State Department’s determination that Samantar was not immune from suit. The Supreme Court does not typically grant cert to correct a lower court’s reasoning. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“[T]his Court reviews judgments, not opinions.”); see also Brief for the United States in Opposition at 15-16, Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2287 (2014) (urging denial of cert to correct a court of appeals’ determination of a legal question because there was no “no reason to think that the outcome of the case would have been different”).

If the Supreme Court takes this case, there is good reason to think that it would be less deferential to the Executive than the Fourth Circuit. As Harlan Cohen has pointed out, the Roberts Court has been distrustful of special executive privileges in foreign affairs. In the closely related context of state immunity, Justice Kennedy has argued that “judicial independence . . . is compromised by case-by-case, selective determinations of jurisdiction by the Executive.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 735 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts could be expected to ask the government precisely where it gets the constitutional authority to make rules governing foreign official immunity. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526-27 (2008) (“Indeed, ‘the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))). This risk alone might be reason for the Solicitor General to think twice about whether to recommend a grant of cert, particularly since the United States agrees with the outcome below. And if the State Department were to change its immunity determination, the Justices’ skepticism about deferring to the Executive would only be likely to grow.

Some—including some former U.S. Attorneys General in this case—have argued that the United States has a reciprocal interest in protecting former U.S. government officials from legal proceedings abroad. But what happens in Samantar will not affect such cases for at least two reasons. First, international law does not require treating jus cogens violations as official acts. Any immunity the United States grants Samantar in this case would be as a matter of comity, not legal obligation. Foreign courts would in no way be bound to give the same immunity to U.S. officials. Second, virtually all the legal proceedings against U.S. officials abroad have been criminal cases, which would be unaffected by what the United States does in a civil case like Samantar. Even countries that grant broad civil immunity to foreign officials do not recognize such immunity in criminal cases (see, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, discussed here). In fact, the Solicitor General told the Supreme Court in Samantar I that “foreign official immunity in the civil context does not imply that foreign officials are entitled to immunity in a criminal case brought by the United States.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 12 n.6, Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). The argument that granting immunity to Samantar is necessary to protect U.S. officials abroad is simply a red herring.

Under normal circumstances, the Solicitor General would try to respond to the Court’s invitation by the end of December, so that the case might be heard this Term. If that timing proves difficult, look for Solicitor General to file his brief in May after the oral arguments for this Term are done but before the Court’s final conference in June. Stay tuned.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

William Dodge is Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, School of Law and Co-Reporter for the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction. From August 2011 to July 2012, he served as Counselor on International Law to the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State.

Copiado de Just Security. Disponível em: https://www.justsecurity.org/16672/samantar-v-yousuf-next/. Acesso em: 19 out. 2015.

The Doctrine of Fundamental Rights of States and the Functions of Anthropomorphic Thinking in International Law

Jean D'Aspremont

University of Manchester - School of Law; University of Amsterdam

October 1, 2015

4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015) (Forthcoming) 

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-38

Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2015-18

Abstract:This article recalls the various manifestations of the anthropomorphic doctrine of the fundamental rights of states with a view to critically examining the various functions of anthropomorphic thinking in international law. This allows the article to provide some critical insights on the remnants of the doctrine of fundamental rights of states and the role played by those anthropomorphic residues in contemporary international law. This article is built on a diachronic examination of the functional changes which the doctrine of fundamental rights of states underwent since its origin. This article, after some introductory considerations on the relations between rights and anthropomorphic thinking, examines how anthropomorphic thinking materialised in the form of a doctrine of fundamental rights of states and came to thrive in international legal thought. The article then turns to the manifestation of the doctrine of fundamental rights of states in the inter-American and United Nations contexts with a view to shedding light on the functions that such positive rules pertaining to the fundamental rights of states were meant to play in the international legal order. The article subsequently discusses the demise of the classical doctrine of fundamental rights of states and the foundering of the codification process in order to examine the role that the remains thereof are meant to play in contemporary international law. It ends with a few concluding remarks on the ubiquity of anthropomorphic thinking about international law. Throughout this examination of the functions of the anthropomorphic doctrine of fundamental rights of states, this article espoused the view that, in of contemporary legal argumentation, the notion of fundamental right of state does not constitute any autonomous construction to which specific legal effects are ascribed but rather a textual package of contestation and resistance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28


Disponível em: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668119. Acesso em: 19 out. 2015.

Resolução das questões de Direito Internacional da Prova da OAB 2014.3, caderno Branco

23) Túlio, brasileiro, é casado com Alexia, de nacionalidade sueca, estando o casal domiciliado no Brasil. Durante um cruzeiro marítimo, na Grécia, ela, após a ceia, veio a falecer em razão de uma intoxicação alimentar. Alexia, quando ainda era noiva de Túlio, havia realizado um testamento em Lisboa, dispondo sobre os seus bens, entre eles, três apartamentos situados no Rio de Janeiro. À luz das regras de Direito Internacional Privado, assinale afirmativa correta.

a) Se houver discussão acerca da validade do testamento, no que diz respeito à observância das formalidades, deverá ser aplicada a legislação brasileira, pois Alexia encontrava se domiciliada no Brasil.

Errado, pois quando se tratar de um testamento feito no exterior deve ser observado os requisitos formais exigidos pela lei local “locus regit actum” – art. 9º, LINDB.

b) Se houver discussão acerca da que diz respeito à observância das formalidades, deverá ser aplicada a legislação portuguesa, local em que foi realizado o ato de disposição da última vontade de Alexia.

Correto, de acordo com o art. 9º da LINDB. As formalidades alusivas à elaboração do testamento são regidas, no Direito Internacional Privado brasileiro, pelo critério “lacus regit actum”, em conformidade com o art. Supracitado. Este por sua vez, estabelece que

“Para qualificar e reger as obrigações, aplicar-se-á a lei do país em que se constituírem”.

Logo, como o testamento foi feito em Portugal, aplicas-se a lei portuguesa no tocante às formalidades pertinentes.

c) A autoridade judiciária brasileira não é competente para proceder ao inventário e à partilha de bens, porquanto Alexia faleceu na Grécia, e não no Brasil.

Errado, pois compete à autoridade judiciária brasileira proceder a inventário e partilha de bens, situados no Brasil, ainda que o autor da herança seja estrangeiro (art. 89, CPC).

d) Se houver discussão acerca do regime sucessório, deverá ser aplicada a legislação sueca, em razão da nacionalidade do de cujus.

Errado, pois o critério adotado pelo Brasil é o do domicílio do defunto (art. 10, LINDB).

GABARITO: Letra B

24) Violento torcedor estrangeiro, integrante de torcida organizada e arrolado como impedido de entrar em estádios de futebol durante a Copa do Mundo, por figurar na lista da Interpol, após ter ingressado irregularmente em território nacional e ser capturado dentro de um dos estádios, tem a sua deportação promovida, por não se retirar voluntariamente. Sobre o caso apresentado, assinale a afirmativa correta.

a) Nunca mais poderá o torcedor estrangeiro deportado reingressar no território nacional.

Errado, pois o deportado poderá reingressar ao Brasil, desde que faça o ressarcimento ao Tesouro Nacional das despesas com a sua deportação (art. 64 do Estatuto do Estrangeiro, Lei 6.815/85). A deportação não impede que o deportado retorne ao território, tampouco a extradição impede que o estrangeiro extraditado retorne ao Brasil. A expulsão sim, ela impede o retorno, salvo com a revogação do decreto de expulsão. (Ler artigo 64 do Estatuto do Estrangeiro).

b) O torcedor estrangeiro deportado só poderá reingressar no território nacional se ressarcir o Tesouro Nacional, com correção monetária, das despesas com a sua deportação e efetuar, se for o caso, o pagamento da multa devida à época, também corrigida.

Correto, transcrição literal do art. 64 do Estatuto do Estrangeiro, Lei 6.815/85 - para responder a questão em pauta, devemos nos atentar ao Estatuto do Estrangeiro, legislação especial, que no Brasil, define quais é os direitos do cidadão imigrante que vive no país já tem mais de 30 anos. Devemos ter, também conhecimento em deportação, à expulsão e a extradição é fundamental tal conhecimento, bem como está a par do Decreto –lei 86.715/1981, sem deixar de mencionar a leitura ao artigo 5 º, inciso XLVII, LI e LII.

c) O torcedor estrangeiro deportado só poderá reingressar no território nacional após o transcurso do lapso prescricional quinquenal para ressarcimento do Tesouro Nacional.

Errado, não há tal causa no Estatuto do Estrangeiro, bastando ao deportado efetivar o pagamento ao Tesouro. Com a análise do art. 64, do Estatuto do Estrangeiro, o mesmo não estabelece o prazo de cinco anos para o retorno ao território nacional.

d) O torcedor estrangeiro deportado poderá retornar se comprovadamente não tiver condições de arcar com o pagamento da quantia devida, sem prejuízo de sua própria subsistência.

Errado, não há tal causa no Estatuto do Estrangeiro. Não haverá exceção quanto ao disposto no art. 64 do Estatuto do Estrangeiro para as pessoas desprovidas de recursos financeiros.

GABARITO: Letra B

Referências:

Comentários retirados do site: <http://www.oabdeprimeira.com.br/como-passar-na-oab-2/questoes-comentadas-oab/questoes-comentadas-xv-exame-direito-internacional/>

Questões e comentários enviados por Natália Lyra; Paula Rayane e Rosana Serra alunas do curso de Direito da UEMA. Editado e postado por Beneilton Gonçalves, Lucas Silva e Thiago Porto, alunos do curso de direito da UEMA

Resolução das questões de Direito Internacional da Prova da OAB 2014.2, caderno Branco

23). Na hipótese de inadimplência do Estado brasileiro, condenado ao pagamento de quantia certa pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, deverá o interessado

a) executá-la perante a Justiça Federal pelo processo interno vigente para a execução de sentenças contra o Estado.

b) pedir que os autos do processo sejam encaminhados ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU para a imposição de sanções internacionais.

c) reivindicar pelo processo vigente no país, porque as sentenças proferidas pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos são desprovidas de executoriedade.

d) postular perante a Corte a intimação do Estado brasileiro para efetuar o pagamento em vinte e quatro horas ou nomear bens à penhora.

GABARITO: Letra A

Comentários: essa questão trata do tema “execução de sentença estrangeira”, traz um caso hipotético em que já existe uma sentença expedida de um órgão jurisdicional internacional contra o Brasil por inadimplência, nestes casos, o interessado deve executá-la perante a Justiça Federal, pelo processo interno vigente.

Tal justificativa encontra-se no art. 68 da Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos e no art. 109 da CF/88. De acordo com o art. 68 – Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos

“Os Estados-partes na Convenção comprometem-se a cumprir a decisão da Corte em todo caso em que forem partes”.

Enquanto o Art. 109 da CF/88, em seus incisos I e III, expressamente define:

“Art.109 Aos juízes federais compete processar e julgar:

I – as causas em que a União, entidade autárquica ou empresa pública federal forem interessadas na condição de autoras, rés, assistentes ou oponentes, exceto as de falência, as de acidentes de trabalho e as sujeitas à Justiça Eleitoral e à Justiça do Trabalho;

III - as causas fundadas em tratado ou contrato da União com Estado estrangeiro ou organismo internacional”

A alternativa “B” está incorreta, pois o Conselho de Segurança da ONU não tem esta finalidade, vez que trata de questões de Guerra.

A alternativa “C” está incorreta, porque ela indica que deve existir um novo processo dentro do Brasil, tendo em vista que a sentença expedida pela Corte Interamericana não teria validade, o que não é verdade.

Por fim, a alternativa “D” está incorreta, vez que, conforme determina a Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, a execução de sentença deve ser realizada no Estado-Parte.

24) A respeito da condição jurídica do estrangeiro, disciplinada pela Lei n. 6.815/80, assinale a afirmativa correta.

a) Nos casos de entrada ou estada irregular de estrangeiro, se este não se retirar voluntariamente do território nacional no prazo fixado em Regulamento, será promovida a sua expulsão.

b) Quando mais de um Estado requerer a extradição da mesma pessoa pelo mesmo fato, terá preferência o pedido daquele em cujo território a infração foi cometida.

c) A República Federativa do Brasil não extradita os seus nacionais, salvo em caso de reciprocidade.

d) Conceder-se-á extradição mesmo quando o fato constituir crime político e o extraditando houver de responder, no Estado requerente, perante tribunal ou juízo de exceção.

GABARITO: Letra B

Comentários: o gabarito correto da questão é a opção letra “B”. Em um primeiro momento é necessário diferenciar três institutos importantes dentro da matéria do Direito Internacional Público: a deportação, a expulsão e a extradição. A deportação é o instituto pelo qual o Estado retira de seu território aquele estrangeiro que se encontra em situação irregular. A expulsão por sua vez é o ato pelo qual o Estado retira compulsoriamente do seu território um estrangeiro considerado nocivo ou inconveniente. Finalmente, a extradição é o ato pelo qual o Estado, mediante o requerimento de outro Estado, entrega-lhe um indivíduo para responder pelos crimes contra a legislação penal daquele país.

A alternativa “A” está incorreta, pois nos termos do art. 57 da Lei 6.815/80 (Estatuto do Estrangeiro) nos casos de entrada ou estada irregular de estrangeiro, se este não se retirar voluntariamente do território nacional no prazo fixado em Regulamento, será promovida sua deportação. Portanto a hipótese apontada na questão trata-se de deportação e não de expulsão.

A alternativa “B” está correta, tendo em vista que o art. 79 do Estatuto do Estrangeiro indica que quando mais de um Estado requerer a extradição da mesma pessoa, pelo mesmo fato, terá preferência o pedido daquele em cujo território a infração foi cometida. Além disso, dispõe em seu

§1º que se tratando de crimes diversos, terão preferência, sucessivamente: I - o Estado requerente em cujo território haja sido cometido o crime mais grave, segundo a lei brasileira; II - o que em primeiro lugar houver pedido a entrega do extraditando, se a gravidade dos crimes for idêntica; III - o Estado de origem, ou, na sua falta, o domiciliar do extraditando, se os pedidos forem simultâneos.

§2º Nos casos não previstos, o impasse será decidido conforme a preferência do governo brasileiro.

A alternativa “C” está errada porque em virtude do que dispõe art. 5º, LI, da CF, o nacional não pode ser extraditado, salvo o brasileiro naturalizado que houver cometido crime comum antes da naturalização ou em caso comprovado de seu envolvimento com tráfico de drogas. Portanto, o brasileiro nato não poderá ser extraditado em hipótese alguma e, o naturalizado, por sua vez, somente poderá ser extraditado nas duas hipóteses elencadas.

A alternativa “D” está errada, pois a constituição não prevê a extradição para crimes políticos, conforme art. 5º, LII:

“não será concedida extradição de estrangeiro por crime político ou de opinião”.

Da mesma forma, nos termos do art. 77, VII do Estatuto do Estrangeiro, é proibida a extradição quando o extraditando houver de responder, no Estado requerente, perante Tribunal ou juízo de exceção.

Questões e comentários enviados por Samuel Rocha, Ludmilla Costa; Igor Lima e Leandro Cerqueira alunos do curso de Direito da UEMA. Editado e postado por Beneilton Gonçalves, Lucas Silva e Thiago Porto, alunos do curso de direito da UEMA

Resolução das questões de Direito Internacional da Prova da OAB 2014.1, caderno Branco

23) Sobre o sistema de regulação de investimentos e fluxo de capital estrangeiro no atual ordenamento jurídico da República Federativa do Brasil, assinale a afirmativa incorreta.

a) É vedada a participação de capital estrangeiro nas empresas jornalísticas e de radiodifusão sonora e de sons e imagens, uma vez que sua propriedade é privativa de brasileiros natos.

b) É vedada a participação direta ou indireta de empresas ou capitais estrangeiros na assistência à saúde no país, salvo nos casos previstos em lei.

c) O sistema financeiro nacional será regulado por leis complementares que disporão, inclusive, sobre a participação do capital estrangeiro nas instituições que o integram.

d) Os investimentos de capital estrangeiro, o incentivo aos reinvestimentos e a regulação à remessa de lucros serão disciplinados em lei, tendo por base o interesse nacional.

GABARITO: Letra A

Comentários: 

Alternativa "A" - A participação de capital estrangeiro nas empresas jornalísticas e de radiodifusão sonora e de sons e imagens não é vedada, mas apenas limitada, conforme dicção do art. 222 §1º da CF, in verbis:

“Art. 222. A propriedade de empresa jornalística e de radiodifusão sonora e de sons e imagens é privativa de brasileiros natos ou naturalizados há mais de dez anos, ou de pessoas jurídicas constituídas sob as leis brasileiras e que tenham sede no País. (Redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional nº 36, de 2002)

§ 1º Em qualquer caso, pelo menos setenta por cento do capital total e do capital votante das empresas jornalísticas e de radiodifusão sonora e de sons e imagens deverá pertencer, direta ou indiretamente, a brasileiros natos ou naturalizados há mais de dez anos, que exercerão obrigatoriamente a gestão das atividades e estabelecerão o conteúdo da programação. (Redação dada pela Emenda Constitucional nº 36, de 2002).”

Alternativa “B” – Correta, correspondendo à literalidade do artigo 199, § 3º, da CF. Assim, a assistência à saúde é livre à iniciativa privada.

Alternativa “C” – Correta pela reprodução ipsis litteris do artigo 192 da CF, o qual preceitua que:

“Art. 192. O sistema financeiro nacional, estruturado de forma a promover o desenvolvimento equilibrado do País e a servir aos interesses da coletividade, em todas as partes que o compõem, abrangendo as cooperativas de crédito, será regulado por leis complementares que disporão, inclusive, sobre a participação do capital estrangeiro nas instituições que o integram.”

Alternativa “D” – Correta. Consoante o artigo 172 da CF:

“Art. 172. A lei disciplinará, com base no interesse nacional, os investimentos de capital estrangeiro, incentivará os reinvestimentos e regulará a remessa de lucros.”

24) A respeito da extradição e/ou expulsão de estrangeiro do Brasil, assinale a afirmativa correta.

a) É passível de extradição o estrangeiro que, de qualquer forma, atentar contra a segurança nacional, a ordem pública ou social, a tranquilidade ou a moralidade pública e a economia popular, ou cujo procedimento o torne nocivo à conveniência e aos interesses nacionais.

b) É passível de extradição o estrangeiro que praticar fraude a fim de obter a sua entrada ou permanência no Brasil.

c) Caberá exclusivamente ao Presidente da República resolver sobre a conveniência e a oportunidade de expulsão do estrangeiro ou de sua revogação.

d) A expulsão do estrangeiro não poderá efetivar-se se houver processo ou ocorrido condenação.

GABARITO: Letra C

Comentários: a expulsão é o ato pelo qual o Estado retira do território nacional o estrangeiro considerado nocivo ou inconveniente aos interesses nacionais. Extradição, por seu turno é o ato pelo qual o Estado entrega a outro Estado um indivíduo acusado de ter violado as leis penais deste outro ente estatal, ou que tenha sido condenado por descumpri-las, para que neste seja submetido a julgamento ou cumpra a pena que lhe foi aplicada, respondendo, assim, pelo ilícito que praticou.

A questão em comento trata da diferença entre extradição e expulsão. Assim, temos:

Alternativa “A” – Incorreta, pois dentro das hipóteses citadas, a Lei 6.815/80 nada fala sobre extradição, conforme se depreende do artigo 65, cujo teor é o seguinte:

“Art. 65. É passível de expulsão o estrangeiro que, de qualquer forma, atentar contra a segurança nacional, a ordem política ou social, a tranqüilidade ou moralidade pública e a economia popular, ou cujo procedimento o torne nocivo à conveniência e aos interesses nacionais (Renumerado pela Lei nº 6.964, de 09/12/81).”

Alternativa “B” – Incorreta, pois o parágrafo único do art. 65, citado retro, o qual preleciona que é passível, também, de expulsão o estrangeiro que praticar fraude com o objetivo de facilitar a sua entrada ou permanência no Brasil.

Alternativa “C” – Correta, por estar em harmonia com o artigo 66 da Lei 6.815/80, o qual dispõe que caberá exclusivamente ao Presidente da República resolver sobre a conveniência e a oportunidade da expulsão ou de sua revogação.

Alternativa “D” – Incorreta, porque o artigo 67 da Lei 6.815/80 declara:

“Desde que conveniente ao interesse nacional, a expulsão do estrangeiro poderá efetivar-se, ainda que haja processo ou tenha ocorrido condenação; a alternativa diz não poderá efetivar”

Questões e comentários enviados por Abraão, Kelvio, Cleidmar e Augusto Batalha alunos do curso de Direito da UEMA. Editado e postado por Beneilton Gonçalves, Lucas Silva e Thiago Porto, alunos do curso de direito da UEMA