Páginas

segunda-feira, 15 de setembro de 2014

Article: The Swiss Vote Against Mass Immigration and International Law: A Preliminary Assessment

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)

April 19, 2014

Migration Policy Practice, 2014, Vol. IV, Number 1, pp. 12-16 

Abstract:
The purpose of this article is to identify which treaties are in contradiction with the new article 121a of the Swiss Constitution. Though this survey is not exhaustive, no fewer than 58 treaties appear to be incompatible with immigration quotas. While covering various fields of international law and relations, these treaties mainly concern three key areas: headquarter agreements concluded with international organizations; conventions governing refugee protection and treaties on the free movement of persons concluded with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. The article further identifies for each type of treaties the different options available to Switzerland.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 5

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426824>. Acesso em 18 jun. 2014.


sexta-feira, 12 de setembro de 2014

Article: Law, Legal Systems, and Legal Families

Surendra Bhandari
Ritsumeikan University - College of International Relations


April 16, 2014

Abstract:

As mentioned by Confucius that ‘Past assists to understand the future’; the concepts of legal systems, and legal families also help us to understand the past, recognize the present, and appreciate the future. Legal families and legal systems are not identical, but are closely interconnected. Law can be described as any standard that is legitimate, valid and enforceable. However, each country might have hundreds, perhaps thousands, of laws. Each law treats one or some specific issues different from other laws. Despite the diversity among laws in terms of contents and treatment, a legal system integrates all laws within its jurisdiction with the help of certain governing principles and rules commonly spread out in all such laws. Similarly, the diversity among laws of different countries is extremely insurmountable in providing an accurate account. For example, after the establishment of the United Nations (UN), more than 180,000 treaties have been concluded, which in a strict sense do not constitute the segment of domestic laws. The idea of legal tradition reduces these insurmountable domestic legal systems into certain groups or families based on their commonalities in terms of legal concepts, in particular the system of legitimacy, validity, and enforceability. In short, a legal system integrates all laws in existence within its jurisdiction. A legal family provides membership to legal systems based on commonalities of principles, rules, and institutions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2425472>. Acesso em 18 jun. 2014.


quarta-feira, 10 de setembro de 2014

Article: What is the Rule of Law and Why is It so Important?

University of Baltimore - School of Law

June 2, 2014

Silkenat, Barenboim and Hickey, eds., "The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State" (Springer, 2014 Forthcoming) 

Abstract:
These reflections on the rule of law consider the rule of law from within the rule of law tradition. This discussion clarifies: (1) what the rule of law is; (2) what the rule of law requires of us; (3) where the rule of law comes from; (4) why it is so valuable; and (5) how we can secure it. Let there be no confusion about the subject matter of this inquiry. The rule of law in its original, best, and most useful sense signifies the "imperium legum" of the ancients, "the empire of laws and not of men" pursued by the early humanists, by the partisans of liberal Enlightenment, and republican revolutions across the globe. This is not the later, positivist, more limited understanding of the rule of law as "Rechtsstaat," which has sapped the rule of law everywhere and caused so much confusion. The rule of law in its original and most natural sense is a pure social good, in which the legalism of the Rechtsstaat plays only a partial and supporting role. Societies that enjoy the rule of law are vastly better situated than those that do not. This makes the real rule of law (or its absence) the central measure dividing good from bad government everywhere. All law and political institutions can and should be evaluated to determine whether it or they advance the rule of law -- or do not.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445057>. Acesso em 18 jun. 2014.


segunda-feira, 8 de setembro de 2014

Article: Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning

University of Western Ontario - Faculty of Law

University of Western Ontario - Faculty of Law; James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University

London School of Economics - Law Department

April 21, 2014

PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING, Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, and Grégoire Webber, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2014 

Abstract:

Proportionality has been received into the constitutional doctrine of courts in Continental Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa, and the United States, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights.

Proportionality provides a common analytical framework for resolving the great moral and political questions confronting political communities. But behind the singular appeal to proportionality lurks a range of different understandings. This volume brings together many of the world's leading constitutional theorists – proponents and critics of proportionality – to debate the merits of proportionality, the nature of rights, the practice of judicial review, and moral and legal reasoning. Their essays provide important new perspectives on this leading doctrine in human rights law.

This is the Introduction to Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, published by Cambridge University Press in April, 2014. In addition to the Introduction, this paper includes a list of contributors and a table of contents.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434091>. Acesso em 3 jun. 2014.


sexta-feira, 5 de setembro de 2014

Article: Soft Law

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

University of Georgia School of Law

May 16, 2014

The Research Handbook on the Economics of Public International Law (E. Kontorovich ed.) (Elgar Publishing, 2014). 

Abstract:

In this chapter, for the Research Handbook on the Economics of Public International Law, we summarize the existing literature on international soft law. We then extend the insights developed therein to explain why states use international legislative institutions — intergovernmental bodies such as the UN General Assembly or the Conferences of the Parties to a number of multilateral treaties — to develop soft law rules. We contend that international legislative institutions do the bulk of their work in the form of soft law and argue that the move toward legislative soft law in international affairs reflects an effort to enhance international law’s effectiveness by weakening the status quo bias inherent in hard law rules to which each state bound must consent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956>. Acesso em 3 jun. 2014.


quarta-feira, 3 de setembro de 2014

Article: Transitional Justice as Genocide Prevention: From a Culture of Impunity to a Culture of Accountability

Yale University - Law School

2014

CONFRONTING GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: DEHUMANIZATION, DENIAL, AND STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION, pp.363-78 (Jean-Damascène Gasanabo, David J. Simon & Margee M. Ensign, eds. 2014) 

Abstract:

The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was the latest — and the most widespread, systematic, destructive, and gruesome — in a series of atrocities that the country had faced over the prior half-century. In light of the culture of impunity that had developed in Rwanda throughout previous decades and that contributed to the genocide in 1994, this chapter surveys the major “transitional justice” initiatives implemented over the last nineteen years. This chapter argues that such mechanisms have played a role in preventing future genocides in Rwanda — and, to some extent, elsewhere — by fostering a culture of accountability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428768>. Acesso em 3 jun. 2014.


segunda-feira, 1 de setembro de 2014

Article: Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Comment

Harvard Law School

April 25, 2014


Abstract:

Many regulators have concluded that cost-benefit analysis is the best available method for capturing the welfare effects of regulations. It is therefore understandable that in recent years, some people have been interested in requiring financial regulators to engage in careful cost-benefit analysis of their regulations, and to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs. Ideas of this sort have played a significant role in judicial review of agency action, especially in cases involving the Securities and Exchange Commission. But it is important to distinguish the question whether courts should require cost-benefit analyses, and review them for arbitrariness, from the separate question whether financial regulators should produce such analyses. It is also important to understand that in some cases, cost-benefit analysis presents serious challenges for financial regulators. When agencies lack relevant information, and cannot project benefits (or costs), they can invoke established techniques to discipline the question whether and how to proceed. In particular, breakeven analysis plays a valuable role. Of course it remains possible that in rare cases, agencies have so little information that they cannot even use breakeven analysis. In such cases, it is not helpful to refer to the precautionary principle or to “expert judgment.” In such rare cases, the best that agencies may be able to do is to rely on some version of maximin, while also seeking to fill informational gaps over time.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429340>. Acesso em 3 jun. 2014.


sexta-feira, 29 de agosto de 2014

Article: Lessons in Transnational Corporate Liability from Bhopal

Columbia Law School

December 25, 2013

Abstract:

The paper below will examine the legal issues that surround the liability of multinational companies in third world countries by examining the Bhopal Gas Disaster incident in India. It will also evaluate the role and implications of the forum non-conveniens doctrine in transnational corporate liability cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429760>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


quarta-feira, 27 de agosto de 2014

Article - Uniformity Versus Specialization (1): The Quest for a Uniform Law of Inter-State Treaties

Queen Mary University of London, School of Law

University of Groningen - Faculty of Law

November 1, 2013

RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, Christian J Tams, Andreas Zimmermann & Antonios Tzanakopoulos (Edward Elgar 2014, Forthcoming) 

Abstract:

The recent proliferation of international courts and tribunals, accompanied by the expansion of areas regulated by international law with ever increasing density, has led to an equally increasing fear of fragmentation both at an institutional and at a normative level. 

The present chapter examines whether the VCLT rules or their customary law equivalents provide the actors in the international arena with a uniform set of rules, or whether practice has demonstrated that they are only a ‘springboard’ allowing the States flexibility to adopt more tailor-made solutions. In order to avoid any overlaps with other contributions in the present Handbook, the analysis will focus on three main areas of the law of treaties: i) the provisions relating to the creation of conventional obligations, ie what is a treaty, ii) the issues relating to consent to be bound and iii) the provisions relating to amendment of treaties. These areas refer, on the one hand, to the emergence of a binding treaty and, on the other, to its continued, albeit somewhat transformed, existence. In this manner a complete overview of the genesis and life of a treaty can be given and certain conclusions can be reached as to the existence or not of a characteristic of uniformity of the relevant provisions amongst inter-State treaties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376701>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


segunda-feira, 25 de agosto de 2014

Article: The Project of Constitutional Sociology: Irritating Nation State Constitutionalism

Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität

April 1, 2014

Transnational Legal Theory 4, 2013, 44-58 

Abstract:

Trends of constitutionalisation can be identified beyond the nation state. They follow two different directions. Outside the limits of the nation state, constitutions emerge in the institutions of international politics, and they emerge simultaneously outside the limits of politics in the ‘private’ sectors of global society. Transnationalisation confronts constitutional sociology with three different challenges: (1) to analyse empirically ongoing constitutionalisation processes beyond the nation state, (2) to develop a theory of transnational societal constitutionalism, and (3) to formulate sociological preconditions for normative perspectives in politics and law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419062>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


sexta-feira, 22 de agosto de 2014

Article - Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: In Retrospect and into the Future


Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

May 9, 2014

Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Volume 38, 2013 

Abstract:

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations has served the international community well by bringing clarity to the norms governing the activity of consular officers. It has had major impact in the protective activities of consuls, in particular in their protection for nationals arrested on a criminal charge in the receiving state.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2435151>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.

quarta-feira, 20 de agosto de 2014

Article: Quelques réflexions sur l'ordre public en droit international privé (Some Remarks on the Public Policy in Private International Law)


Université de La Rochelle

April 23, 2014

Abstract:

French Abstract: Ensemble avec l’exception de fraude, l’exception d’ordre public constitue l’un des piliers de la reconnaissance des jugements et autres actes publics étrangers. L’importance du sujet s’accroît ces dernières années avec le contentieux concernant la gestation pour autrui et avec la réflexion doctrinale sur la reconnaissance unilatérale des situations juridiques en droit international privé. Pourtant la notion même de l'ordre public n'a pas de définition précise en droit et dans la doctrine français. Cette indétermination de la notion de l’ordre public a deux conséquences négatives. Premièrement, elle entraîne parfois des incohérences dans l’application de l’exception du même nom, notamment en ce qui concerne l’ordre public de proximité ou d’éloignement et les clauses spéciales d’ordre public. Deuxièmement, son indétermination brouille la frontière entre cette notion et celle des lois de police. Et surtout, l’indétermination de l’ordre public est une source d’insécurité juridique. 

English Abstract: The public policy defense, including due process defense, is one of the most important points of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and other foreign public acts. The importance of the subject matter in Europe grows these last years with the surrogacy litigation and with the scholar researches on the recognition of legal situations in private international law. Though the very concept of the ordre public has no precise definition in french law nor in jurisprudence. Such indetermination of the concept of ordre public has two negative consequences. First, it may lead to the incoherence in the application of the exception of ordre public, namely sometimes in case of the "ordre public de proximité" or so called "special ordre public clauses". Second, its indetermination makes uncertain the frontier between this concept and the concept of overriding mandatory provisions. And after all, the indetermination of the ordre public creates legal uncertainty.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428662>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


segunda-feira, 18 de agosto de 2014

Article: Facts, Reasons and Joint Action: Thoughts on the Social Ontology of Law

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

April 28, 2014

(2014) 44 Rechtstheorie (Forthcoming) 
Discusiones (in Spanish) Forthcoming) 

Abstract:

This paper explores the hypothesis that law is a kind of joint action. The paper proceeds by way of a comment on Carlos Bernal's ‘Austin, Hart and Shapiro: Three Variations on Law as an Entity Grounded in a Social Practice’ (published in Rechtstheorie and to be published in Discusiones [in Spanish]), which aims to show how social ontology illuminates the nature of law, and more specifically, how the modern study of social reality makes clear the frustrated promise of Austin and Hart’s work and the power of Shapiro’s account (suitably tweaked and elaborated) by contrast. The paper considers and contributes further to Bernal’s conversation with Austin, Hart and Shapiro, while discussing also salient contributions from Aquinas and others. The paper shares Bernal's concern to explore the way in which, if at all, law is the joint action of some group, but is not wholly persuaded by his argument and briefly outlines an alternative.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2430247>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.

sexta-feira, 15 de agosto de 2014

Article: Authority, Legitimacy and Obligation in Law's Empire (and Justice for Hedgehogs)


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Notre Dame Law School

June 6, 2011


Abstract:

In June 2011 a closed seminar was held in the Faculty of Law at the University of Oxford to mark the 25th anniversary of the publication of Law’s Empire. Papers were sent to Ronald Dworkin in advance, and he commented on them at appropriate points in the seminar. This is the appreciative paper I contributed. It revises the account I gave in 1987 of Dworkin’s theory of authority, belatedly crediting it with substance and richness (and a traditional character) that I had overlooked. Still, my 1987 comments on the thinness of Dworkin’s account of the human goods at stake are retained and are extended in the present paper to critique the thinness of his account of the cultural and other presuppositions or prerequisites of sustainable political communities and their authority structures. This critique doubtless extends to all theories of merely “constitutional" patriotism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2431419>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


quarta-feira, 13 de agosto de 2014

Article - On Normativity and Responsibility: Responses


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Columbia University - Law School; King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law

October 13, 2013

Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, (2013), pp. 1-15 

Abstract:

Contains responses to comments by Chang, Hestein and Heuer on "From Normativity to Responsibility". The paper responds to various criticisms especially about methodology, the bearing of a secure area of competence on responsibility, the univocality of 'reasons', the relations of value and practical reasons, the scope of rational powers, the function of reasons to be rational, and most extensively about following reasons and the distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (where Heuer has pointed out some deficiencies in the discussion of the matter in the book).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339773>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.

segunda-feira, 11 de agosto de 2014

Article: A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart's (Inadvertent) Defence of the Indistinctiveness of Law


Centre for Law and Cosmopolitan Values - University of Antwerp; University of Rome I - Department of Philosophy

May 5, 2014


Abstract:

This article claims that H.L.A. Hart’s theory may be regarded as a sound vindication of what today is known as legal pluralism. In short, Hart’s practice theory of norms attests to the fact that state law is only one system of rules among many others, and that it does not exhibit any distinctive feature that may distinguish it from those others. I will depict this as an inadvertent but extremely valuable outcome of the practice theory. Indeed, Hart’s battle against the claimed connection between law and coercion and his firm conviction that legal normativity should be understood in light of the broader phenomenon of social normativity make his practice theory of rules a sound and fertile vindication of legal pluralism as a theoretical approach to legal phenomena. As a result, even though Hart was a legal centralist and a legal monist, his theorizing ends up dismantling the identity between the general phenomenon of law and the law of the state. I will proceed as follows: I will first look at the contentious issue of the relation between law and coercion by examining how two prominent legal scholars, Hans Kelsen and E. Adamson Hoebel, came to the conclusion that the distinguishing mark of law is coercion (sec. 1). This analysis will be instrumental in demonstrating that Hart failed to grasp the relevance and salience of the relation between law and coercion, and in particular, the peculiar role Kelsen and Hoebel attributed to the latter (sec. 2). I will argue that Hart’s discomfort with the emphasis on the notion of coercion was due not to the nature of this notion as such, but to the distortive effect its overemphasis had exerted on positivist legal theorizing. I will claim that Hart’s most insidious adversaries were two (at the time prominent) philosophical and jurisprudential streams, namely, behaviourism and emotivism (sec. 3). I will go on to say that Hart’s arguments against these adversaries are well addressed but inadequate, and will try to reinforce them by drawing on a Wittgensteinian view of practices (sec. 4). I will conclude by showing that the consistent outcome of a “reinforced” practice theory is a highly pluralist view of law (sec. 5).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433153>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.

sexta-feira, 8 de agosto de 2014

Article: Truth Commissions, Human Rights and Gender. Normative Changes in Transitional Moments


Center for Conflict Studies

May 2, 2014

Abstract:

Over the past two decades dealing with the past of violent conflict and repression has become a global norm. While in its initial stages many efforts to provide justice post-violence were gender-neutral — rendering them gender-blind — more recent practical yet also academic contributions challenge this assumption from a gender and/or feminist perspective. Against this backdrop the paper asks what kind of crimes are considered to be relevant in transitional justice processes and if and how redressing them bears the potential of contributing to wider social changes towards gender just societies. The paper focuses on truth commissions which, due to their specific set-up, have been successful in incorporating sexual and gender-based crimes since they are more inclined towards providing spaces for victims, thus potentially serving as a platform for women to come forward to report about abuses. It argues that there have been significant normative changes regarding the kind of crimes redressed in truth commissions, illustrating that rather than being fixed and permanent, what is considered to be right (or wrong) is changing over time.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432164>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


quarta-feira, 6 de agosto de 2014

Article: Brazil's Landmark Clean Companies Act: Comparison to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and Issues

Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal

March 1, 2014

Abstract:

Corruption in the international marketplace remains an endemic problem. The U.S. government estimates that bribery affects competition for international commercial contracts worth billions of dollars each year. Astonishingly, big names, some of which enjoy a generally good reputation, appear on the list of companies who have allegedly engaged in bribery of foreign public officials. This list includes Alcoa World Alumina LLC, Walmart, AG Simons, Halliburton, Lucent Technologies, Chevron, BAE Systems PLC, Baker Hughes, Monsanto, Titan Corporation, Triton Energy Limited, Avon Products, and Invision Technologies. 

Bribery on international level results in many grave consequences. It distorts markets, hinders economic development and undermines democratic accountability. It inflicts massive costs on countries, causes misallocation of resources, distorts public policy, and undermines enforcement of rule of law. It hurts those companies that choose to follow the law and rightfully refuse to participate in bribery of others. Bribery in the international marketplace also severely threatens global security as it enables transnational crimes including drug trafficking and money laundering. 

On August 1, 2013, Brazil enacted the Clean Companies Act (the Brazilian Act), placing administrative and civil liability on legal entities engaging in bribery of public officials. The new Act went into effect on January 29, 2014. This is a landmark development for several reasons. Brazil is the sixth largest economy in the world, ranked by GDP. It is also the largest and one of the most robust economies in Latin America, an area that is of special significance for U.S. companies conducting business on international level. Meanwhile, corruption is a widespread and long-rooted phenomenon in Brazil. According to some studies, corruption costs the country approximately $40 billion each year. In 2012, Transparency International ranked Brazil as the 69th most corrupt country, out of 174 countries, on its International Corruption Perceptions Index. This rank shows that the nation has "significant problems with corruption." Despite such prevalence of corruption in Brazil, before the enactment of the Clean Companies Act, Brazil’s express laws only held individuals liable for engaging in bribery of public officials, not legal entities. Because Brazil has signed on to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the Convention), the OECD’s Working Group is scheduled to review the new Brazilian Act in June 2014 and issue its report on whether the law meets the Convention’s requirements. 

This Comment argues that while the provisions of the new Brazilian Act generally conform to or exceed those of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, whether Brazil will actually and properly enforce the law will determine if Brazil will meet OECD’s expectations and those of its people. This Comment enumerates three key steps Brazil should take in order to effectively enforce its new law. Part II of this Comment explores the evolution of anti-bribery laws on the international level, the OECD’s role, and circumstances behind enactment of Brazil’s Clean Companies Act. Part III compares each provision of the OECD’s Anti-bribery Convention to those of the Clean Companies Act and concludes that the Brazilian law meets each provision except Enforcement. Part IV proposes three key steps that Brazil should take in order to effectively enforce its new law. Specifically, Brazil should make it a top priority to aggressively and objectively investigate and prosecute cases of bribery of public officials. It should ensure that all of the enforcement agencies across Brazil adopt uniform procedures and interpretations of the law. Lastly, it should collaborate with other countries in investigations and prosecutions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417155>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.

segunda-feira, 4 de agosto de 2014

Book Review: The Cambridge Companion on International Law

South Asian University

October 31, 2013

2013 GJLDP (3) 2 Page 149 

Abstract:

The book under review is not merely repackaging of existing materials of international law, rather this well organized book, edited by Professor James Crawford and Professor Martti Koskenniemi, is testament to the diversity of exciting new researches being conducted in the coliseum of international law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416854>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


sexta-feira, 1 de agosto de 2014

Article: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under TTIP – A Risk for Environmental Regulation?

Ecologic Institute, Berlin

Ecologic Institute

December 31, 2013

Heinrich Böll Stiftung TTIP Series, December 2013 

Abstract:

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could include rules on investment protection, including so called investor- state dispute settlement (ISDS). ISDS is a system that allows private investors to sue a host state for the alleged violation of an international investment treaty concluded between that host state and the investor’s country of origin. The EU Commission’s negotiating mandate for TTIP and the US model bilateral investment treaty both indicate a preference for including ISDS in TTIP. 

There are a number of clauses routinely contained in investment treaties that have the potential to restrict the right of governments to take environmental measures: the requirement of “fair and equal treatment” for investors, a prohibition on “(indirect) expropriation”, and the so-called umbrella clause. All of them are often broad and vague in wording, and; the case law interpreting them is not consistent. 

Although investment tribunals never invalidate environmental regulations, nor have any similar direct impact on national environmental policies, they have – in some cases – awarded considerable compensatory payments to investors for a violation of the above clauses. The inclusion of any of these norms in TTIP would not automatically prevent the US or the EU adopting environmental measures in the future, nor would they necessarily have to pay compensation to investors whenever doing so. However, the results of ISDS proceedings are unpredictable. Some arbitration tribunals have taken a restrictive approach to governments’ regulatory freedom; others have deemed government regulation not to violate investment law. These uncertainties result in considerable risks for environmental regulation which are exacerbated by the fact that investment-related provisions tend to be interpreted broadly in ISDS proceedings.

There are no strong arguments for including ISDS rules in TTIP. Both the US and the EU have highly evolved, efficient rule of law legal systems. There is no evidence that investors have ever lacked appropriate legal protection through these systems. There is no bilateral investment treaty between the US and any of the old EU Member States, and yet US and EU investors already make up for more than half of foreign direct investment in each others’ economies. This demonstrates that investors seem to be satisfied with the rule of law on both sides of the Atlantic. 

ISDS provides foreign investors with an additional judicial remedy that is not available to domestic competitors; this additional avenue of legal redress discriminates against domestic companies and has the potential to distort competition. Furthermore, the sheer size of foreign direct investment could lead to a considerable number of investment disputes. As a consequence, large numbers of disputes that normally would be adjudicated in domestic courts would be subject to international arbitration, bypassing domestic judges that have been elected or appointed by elected officials. 

However, in the event that provisions on ISDS are nonetheless included in TTIP, this paper provides suggestions on how to formulate such provisions in order to mitigate the risk to environmental regulations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416450>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


quarta-feira, 30 de julho de 2014

Book Chapter - Chapter 9: Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)


Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI) - The Graduate Institute, Geneva

April 3, 2014

in Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law, A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos (eds), Cambridge: CUP (2014 Forthcoming) 
SHARES Research Paper 39 (2014) 

Abstract:

The contribution considers the extent to which the aggravated regime of international responsibility accommodates the scenario of several entities involved in the commission of serious breaches of peremptory norms. We explore this question by examining issues of shared responsibility in light of structural, substantive, and procedural aspects of serious breaches.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419897>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


segunda-feira, 28 de julho de 2014

Article: Theorizing Precedent in International Law

University of Georgia School of Law

April 2, 2014

Interpretation in International Law (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 

Abstract:

Precedent presents a puzzle for international law. As a matter of doctrine, judicial decisions construing international law are not-in-and-of themselves law. They are not binding on future parties in future cases, even before the same tribunal. And yet, international precedent is everywhere. From international investment to international criminal law to international human rights to international trade, prior decisions are invoked, argued over, and applied as precedents by practitioners and by tribunals. 

How and why do certain interpretations of international law take on the weight of precedent, reshaping international law arguments around them, while others do not? This chapter develops a framework for explaining the emergence of precedent in international law that can begin to solve this puzzle. It focuses on three sets of factors relevant to a prior interpretation’s precedential weight, (1) the varied potential sources of precedent, (2) the factors that might imbue a source with authority, (3) and the actors and audiences who might invoke a precedent or respond it, before weaving them into three overlapping accounts of how these factors interact, (1) a rationalist account, (2) a jurisprudential account, (3) and a sociological account. The chapter ends with a couple of case-studies that demonstrate how these factors and accounts can help explain the actual patterns of precedent we observe in international law today.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419706>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


sexta-feira, 25 de julho de 2014

Article: H.L.A. Hart's Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School

Geoffrey Shaw

Yale University - Law School; University of Oxford

December 20, 2013


Abstract: 

This Essay analyzes an essay by H. L. A. Hart about discretion that has never before been published, and has often been considered lost. Hart, one of the most significant legal philosophers of the twentieth century, wrote the essay at Harvard Law School in November 1956, shortly after he arrived as a visiting professor. In the essay, Hart argued that discretion is a special mode of reasoned, constrained decisionmaking that occupies a middle ground between arbitrary choice and determinate rule application. Hart believed that discretion, soundly exercised, provides a principled way of coping with legal indeterminacy that is fully consistent with the rule of law. This Essay situates Hart’s paper — Discretion — in historical and intellectual context, interprets its main arguments, and assesses its significance in jurisprudential history. In the context of Hart’s work, Discretion is notable because it sketches a theory of legal reasoning in depth, with vivid examples. In the context of jurisprudential history, Discretion is significant because it sheds new light on long-overlooked historical and theoretical connections between Hart’s work and the Legal Process School, the American jurisprudential movement dominant at Harvard during Hart’s year as a visiting professor. Hart’s Discretion is part of our jurisprudential heritage, advancing our understanding of legal philosophy and its history.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2431325>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.








quarta-feira, 23 de julho de 2014

Article - Citizenship: Historical Development of

Richard Bellamy 
University College London - Department of Political Science

April 27, 2014

'Citizenship: Historical Development of', in James Wright (ed), International Encyclopaedia of Social and Behavioural Sciences, 2nd ed., Elsevier, 2014 Forthcoming 

Abstract:

Historically, the distinctive core of citizenship has been the possession of the formal status of membership of a political and legal entity and having particular sorts of rights and obligations within it. This core understanding of citizenship goes back to classical times and coalesced around two broad understandings of citizenship stemming from ancient Greece and Imperial Rome respectively that later evolved into what came to be termed the ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ accounts of citizenship. This entry first examines these two classic views, then looks at how they changed during the Renaissance and Reformation, and finally turns to the ways the two were to some extent brought together following the American and French revolutions within the liberal-democratic nation state.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2429855>. Acesso em 25 maio 2014.


segunda-feira, 21 de julho de 2014

Article: Executive Deference, Sovereign Immunity, and NML Capital v. Argentina: A Constitutional Analysis of Sovereign Immunity Litigation

University of Illinois College of Law

February 14, 2014


Abstract:

NML Capital v. Argentina is a prime example of how the current sovereign immunity litigation regime is devoid of constitutional analysis. This Paper attempts to trace out the historic constitutional analysis underlying sovereign immunity claims in the context of sovereign debt defaults and apply them to the current litigation. The history of the sovereign debt market and constitutional challenges to those changes as well as the evolution of constitutional analysis of sovereign debt litigation indicate a longstanding constitutional framework. This paper explores how the Argentina litigation fits within the broader framework of historical sovereign immunity litigation — and suggests that the Supreme Court can reestablish the traditional constitutional deference to the executive in this litigation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396192>. Acesso em 3 maio 2014.

sexta-feira, 18 de julho de 2014

Book Chapter: International Organizations: Personality, Immunities, Responsibility, and Remedies

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

February 1, 2014

D. Sarooshi, ed., Mesures de réparation et responsabilité à raison des actes des organisations internationales/Remedies and Responsibility for the Actions of International Organizations (Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014) Chapter 1 

Abstract:

The law of international organizations is undergoing profound changes. This has been caused in large part by the increasingly important role that international organizations have played in exercising powers conferred on them by national governments. This phenomenon has led to concerted attempts by States, international courts and tribunals, and domestic courts to seek to ensure accountability for these exercises of power by imposing corresponding limits on international organisations. This volume is focused on several key aspects of this accountability process: the content of the rules of international law relating to when can an international organization be held responsible for its breach of a primary rule of international (the law codified in the UN draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (“DARIO”)), when can an international organization plead immunity from jurisdiction of national and possibly international tribunals, and what remedies can be taken against an international organisation. The chapters in this volume are the result of research conducted by outstanding junior academics who were participants in the 2011 Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations of the Hague Academy of International Law. This author had the good fortune of being the Director of both the English and French sections of the Centre for Research and enjoyed immensely providing supervision and guidance to these talented young academics.

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398558>. Acesso em 3 maio 2014.



Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

quarta-feira, 16 de julho de 2014

EJIL: Talk! - The Genesis of Lex Specialis

Published on April 30, 2014 Author: Marko Milanovic

When it comes to describing the relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law, the lex specialis principle is frequently taken for granted, as if it has somehow always been there, carved in stone. But what is its actual genesis? By ‘genesis’ I do not mean its ancient history. Yes, it was in the Digest of Justinian. But, honestly, who cares? We have little or no idea of what exactly the lawyers of the Roman and Byzantine empires meant by the expression and how they applied it in practice, and indeed there are several different ways of conceptualizing lex specialis.

My question is rather this: when did we, the community of international lawyers, start using this language to describe the relationship between IHL and IHRL? The timeframe for answering that question is necessarily more limited and easier to manage, since IHRL did not become a part of public international law until after the Second World War. I am obviously too young to have direct experience of this, but my impression has been that during the first fifty years or so of their co-existence very little thought was given to how IHL and IHRL would interact, and when the issue was discussed it was generally not framed in terms of lex specialis. My hypothesis is thus that the term entered common parlance among the international lawyers who have dealt with the issue only after the end of the Cold War, and specifically only after the ICJ’s 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, para. 25, when the Court itself first used the term:

In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.

To prove or disprove this hypothesis, which is what I am doing in a paper I’m writing right now, I need to do two things. First, I need to establish how the Court itself got the idea to use the lex specialis principle to describe the relationship between the rules of IHL and IHRL. Was it complete innovation on its part? Did it come from the pleadings of some of the participants in the advisory proceedings? Or did it come from generally accepted scholarship on the issue? Second, I need to look at the scholarship itself, specifically those works that examined the issue before the Nuclear Weapons opinion and immediately after it.

The pre-1996 scholarship I will leave aside for the purpose of this post, but from what I’ve read so far there are few, if any references to the lex specialis principle as a solution to normative conflicts between IHL and IHRL (I will obviously very much appreciate it if readers could point me to any such references in scholarship in whatever language). But I’ve read through all of the pleadings in the two nuclear weapons cases (the WHO and GA requests), both written and oral. And out of the 40 or so states that appeared before the Court in the two cases, do you know how many referred to thelex specialis principle? Just one – the United Kingdom.

In the first round of the WHO case the UK did not even discuss the human rights issue. When it came to the second round of written pleadings, which were due at the same time as the first round of pleadings for the General Assembly Nuclear Weapons case, the UK decided to give its comments on the submissions in the WHO case in its written statement in Nuclear Weapons, i.e. that single document was both the second submission in the WHO case and the first in Nuclear Weapons. The UK now did extensively discuss human rights and environmental law, arguing that the issue was not the compatibility of nuclear weapons with these legal regimes in abstracto, but ‘whether any of the rules of the law of human rights or the law on environmental protection can be construed, in accordance with the general principles stated above, as prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons when carried out by way of legitimate self-defence.’ (WS, para. 3.98 (emphasis in original)).

In that regard, the UK noted that Article 15(2) ECHR explicitly referred to derogations from the right to life for deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, and argued that:

Although the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains no provision equivalent to Article 15(2) of the European Convention, Article 6(1) prohibits only the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life. If the Covenant is applicable at all to the taking of life in the context of an armed conflict, it is necessary to determine what the term ‘arbitrary’ means in that context. Since the taking of life is an inescapable feature of the conduct of armed conflict and since it has never seriously been suggested that the Covenant outlaws the use of force by way of national self-defence, the reference to ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life must contain the means for distinguishing between those acts of taking life in armed conflict which are compatible with Article 6 of the Covenant and those which are not. The only sensible construction which can be placed on the term ‘arbitrary’ in this context is that it refers to whether or not the deliberate taking of life is unlawful under that part of international law which was specifically designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities, that is the laws of armed conflict. On that basis, the use of a weapon to take life in armed conflict could only amount to an arbitrary deprivation of life, for the purposes of Article 6 of the Covenant, if it was contrary to the laws of armed conflict but not otherwise.
(WS, para. 3.101)

After briefly looking at the travaux of the Covenant and the work of the Human Rights Committee, the UK concluded its submissions on human rights as follows:

The protection given by the law of human rights does nor, therefore, lead to a different conclusion regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons from that provided by the law of armed conflict. Since the law of human rights is concerned primarily with the protection of human rights in peacetime, whereas the law of armed conflict is a lex specialis designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities, it is entirely appropriate that the human rights agreements should, in effect, refer to the law of armed conflict in order to determine whether or not any particular instance of the deprivation of life in wartime is arbitrary. The same principle applies,a fortiori, in respect of the protection of other human rights.
(WS, para. 3.108)

This, then, was the very first appearance of lex specialis in the written pleadings, and indeed theonly such appearance in the UK’s written statement. Notably, neither of the paragraphs I have just quoted in full provide any references or citations to authority of any kind. The UK’s counsel obviously did their job well, since the language of the UK’s submissions is clearly reflected in paragraph 25 of the Court’s Nuclear Weapons opinion. This is, to my mind, undoubtedly the intellectual genesis of the Court’s holding. In the combined oral hearings in the two cases no state, not even the UK, nor France, nor the United States, nor Russia, mentioned lex specialis, although the UK did articulate a version thereof without the Latin: CR 1995/34, at 43-44.

So why is this relevant? I do not want to go here into the merits or demerits of lex specialis and its various different conceptions. My only point is this: despite the Latin veneer of antiquity, and whatever its merits, the lex specialis principle was NOT part of mainstream thinking on the relationship between IHL and IHRL before the 1996 opinion (assuming there was any mainstream thinking on this issue in the first place). If it was, one would have expected more than one, single, isolated and conclusory reference to the principle in the hundreds of pages of written and oral pleadings before the ICJ.

Disponível em: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-genesis-of-lex-specialis/>. Acesso em 3 maio 2014.

segunda-feira, 14 de julho de 2014

Article: National Treatment and MFN in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

February 24, 2014

Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 15, 2014, Forthcoming 

Abstract:

This article discusses the potential provisions on national treatment and MFN to be included in a future EU Model BIT against the background of the leaked draft text of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) investment chapter. It concludes that the EU treaty practice seems to be closer to investment protection models influenced by NAFTA, such as those prevalent in the Canada and US Model BITs, and that a future EU Model BIT along these lines will depart significantly from the investment treaty practice of EU Member States.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400824>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.

sexta-feira, 11 de julho de 2014

Article: Climate Change Refugees

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

February 26, 2014

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Forthcoming 

Abstract:

Under the UNHCR definition of a refugee, set out in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, people fleeing their homes because of natural disasters or other environmental problems do not qualify for refugee status and the protection that come from such status. In a recent paper, "Who Are Refugees?", I defended the essentials of the UNHCR definition on the grounds that refugee status and protection is best reserved for people who can only be helped by granting them refuge in a safe state for an indefinite period of time, and argued that this does not include most people fleeing from natural disasters. This claim is most strongly challenged by possibility of displacement from climate change. In this paper I will explore to what degree the logic of the refugee convention, as set out in my earlier paper, can and should be extended to those fleeing the results of climate change, and will argue that the logic of the refugee convention tells in favor of extending refugee protection to a portion of those who must flee their homes because of climate-change related environmental problems.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2402033>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.


quarta-feira, 9 de julho de 2014

Article: Human Rights to Culture, Family, and Self-Determination: The Case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

University of Colorado Law School

Suffolk University Law School

February 26, 2014

Forthcoming in STEFAN KIRCHNER AND JOAN POLICASTRI, EDS., INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

Abstract:

The well-being of indigenous children is a subject of major concern for indigenous peoples and human rights advocates alike. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not prevent the adoption of a Cherokee child by a non-Indian couple. This occurred over the objections of her Cherokee biological father, extended family, and Tribal Nation. After the decision, Baby Girl’s father and the adoptive couple contested the matter in a number of proceedings, none of which considered the child’s best interests as an Indian child. The tribally-appointed attorney for Baby Girl, as well as the National Indian Child Welfare Association and National Congress for American Indians, began examining additional venues for advocacy. Believing that the human rights of Baby Girl, much like those of other similarly situated indigenous children, were being violated in contravention of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights, and other instruments of international law, they asked us to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples Rights (“UNSR”). We prepared a “statement of information” to alert the UNSR of the human rights violations occurring in the case. With the permission of the attorneys and organizations involved, this chapter introduces the Baby Girl case, contextualizes the claims in international human rights law, and then reproduces the statement of information and portions of the UNSR’s subsequent public statement. It concludes with an update on the Baby Girl case and broader discussion about the potential for using international law and legal forums to protect the human rights of indigenous children.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401886>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.

segunda-feira, 7 de julho de 2014

Article: The Changing Architecture of International Climate Change Law

Stockholm Environment Institute; University of Oxford; VU University Amsterdam

University of Greifswald; Ecologic - Institute for International and European Environmental Policy

Stockholm Environment Institute

February 28, 2014

Forthcoming in Van Calster, G., Vandenberghe, W., and Reins, L. (eds.), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014. 

Abstract:

This chapter offers a bird’s eye view of the overall architecture of international climate change law. Following a discussion of the defining features of climate change law, it discusses the origins and development of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and subsequent arrangements adopted under its auspices, notably the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2010 Cancún Agreements. The chapter shows that while the UNFCCC process has grown more complex over time – in terms of its rules, institutions and the actors involved – so has international climate change law and governance more generally. It illustrates this argument by drawing attention to six observable trends: (i) the multiplication of international forums addressing climate change; (ii) the softening of commitments; (iii) the changing nature of differentiation; (iv) the utilization of innovative policy instruments; (v) the increasing focus on litigation; and (vi) the growing importance of nonstate actors and transnational governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2402770>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.

sexta-feira, 4 de julho de 2014

Article: Supra-Legality of International Human Rights Treaties and Constitutional Interpretation

Universidade Federal do Pará

August 1, 2012

SUR International Journal on Human Rights, v. 10, n. 18, Jun. 2013 

Abstract:

In December 2008, when ruling on a number of cases involving the civil imprisonment of unfaithful trustees, the Supreme Court modified its understanding of the hierarchy of international human rights treaties in Brazilian law, adopting the thesis of supra-legality. This article analyzes the potential impacts that this change can have on constitutional interpretation in Brazil, examining how the Supreme Court has applied the thesis of supra-legality and the extent to which the hierarchy of international human rights treaties has influenced, in other countries, their use in interpreting the Constitution. The article concludes that supra-legality allows for the construction of arguments in favor of using human rights treaties as a parameter of constitutional interpretation in Brazilian law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401224>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.


quarta-feira, 2 de julho de 2014

Article: Theorizing Precedent in International Law

University of Georgia School of Law

April 2, 2014

Interpretation in International Law (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 

Abstract:

Precedent presents a puzzle for international law. As a matter of doctrine, judicial decisions construing international law are not-in-and-of themselves law. They are not binding on future parties in future cases, even before the same tribunal. And yet, international precedent is everywhere. From international investment to international criminal law to international human rights to international trade, prior decisions are invoked, argued over, and applied as precedents by practitioners and by tribunals. 

How and why do certain interpretations of international law take on the weight of precedent, reshaping international law arguments around them, while others do not? This chapter develops a framework for explaining the emergence of precedent in international law that can begin to solve this puzzle. It focuses on three sets of factors relevant to a prior interpretation’s precedential weight, (1) the varied potential sources of precedent, (2) the factors that might imbue a source with authority, (3) and the actors and audiences who might invoke a precedent or respond it, before weaving them into three overlapping accounts of how these factors interact, (1) a rationalist account, (2) a jurisprudential account, (3) and a sociological account. The chapter ends with a couple of case-studies that demonstrate how these factors and accounts can help explain the actual patterns of precedent we observe in international law today.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419706>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.

segunda-feira, 30 de junho de 2014

Article: Upending a Global Debate: An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Transnational Law to Interpret Domestic Doctrine

Michigan State University - Department of Political Science

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Wisconsin - Madison

University of Wisconsin - Madison

February 25, 2014


Abstract:

Over the last ten years, judges, scholars, and policymakers have argued — quite vehemently at times — about whether U.S. courts should use transnational sources of law to interpret domestic legal doctrine. All eyes in this debate focus on the U.S. Supreme Court and its use, misuse, and alleged use of transnational law. And almost all the debates are normative. Some scholars and judges argue the Court is correct to use transnational law. Others believe to do so is constitutional apostacy. Still, the controversy seems to have generated more heat than light. Among the clamor can be found little empirical work on the conditions under which Supreme Court Justices actually use transnational law. Is it in fact the case that only liberal Justices employ transnational law — or do conservatives as well? In addition, there is little work on which countries Justices cite when they do use transnational law. Do they cherry pick whichever country works best in the given case, or is there a lower bound of plausibility when selecting countries to examine and cite? 

The authors provide the most systematic empirical exploration of the Court’s use of transnational law to date. Their results challenge conventional wisdom and prove to upend the existing debates over transnational law. The data show that Justices are more likely to reference transnational law when they exercise judicial review and when they overturn precedent, which likely explains much of the controversy around the practice. Importantly, the data show, further, that all Justices cite transnational law. Liberals cite transnational law when they render liberal decisions, and conservatives cite transnational law when they render conservative decisions. Liberals and conservatives alike employ such law because they are both ideologically conscious, strategic judicial actors who seek to support their decisions with as much persuasive material as possible. Finally, the results suggest that Justices cite countries with regard to their political and legal characteristics. They cite what the public would consider to be among the most legitimate countries across the globe. In other words, on the whole, Justices seem to borrow from countries most like the U.S. Whether these results are good or bad is unclear; what is clear, however, is that the normative debate over using transnational law must take a turn and address the authors’ findings.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401116>. Acesso em 22 abr. 2014.

sexta-feira, 27 de junho de 2014

Blog post: New Czech Act on Private International Law

by GILLES CUNIBERTI on APRIL 17, 2014

By Petr Briza, co-founding partner of Briza & Trubac, a Czech law firm focusing on cross-border litigation and arbitration, among others.

Regular readers of this blog might recall this post that referred to my article at Transnational Notes about the new Czech Act on Private International Law. The article provided a short general description of the new law that entered into effect on January 1, 2014. In this post I would like to introduce in more detail some provisions of the act, especially those that are not preceded by the EU legislation and thus will govern cases heard by Czech courts. Also, below you will find the link to the English translation of the full text of this new act on private international law.

Introductory remarks

For general comments on the new law I refer to my post at Transnational Notes. Here I will only shortly sum up couple of the main facts.

The act (published under No. 91/2012 Coll.) is part of the private law recodification whose main pillars are the new Civil Code (No. 89/2012 Coll.) and the new Business Corporations Act (No. 90/2012 Coll.). The act has 125 sections divided into 9 parts: (1) General Provisions (§ 1 – 5), (2) General Provisions of Procedural International Law (§ 6 – 19), (3) General Provisions of Private International Law (§ 20 – 28), (4) Provisions Concerning Individual Types of Private-Law Relations (§ 29 – 101), (5) Judicial Cooperation in Relations with Foreign States (§ 102 – 110), (6) Insolvency Proceedings (§ 111 – 116), (7) Arbitration and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (§ 117 – 122), (8) Transitional and Final Provisions (§ 123 – 124) and (9) Entry into Force (§ 125).

Now I will turn to the provisions that might be of interest for foreign readers.

General issues (§ 1-5 and 20-25)

The law regulates general issues of private international law, such as public policy (ordre public) exception, overriding mandatory rules, renvoi, qualification (characterisation), preliminary questions or application of foreign law. Unlike the previous “old” act (No. 97/1963 Coll.), the law does not define “ordre public”; instead it only introduces public policy (public ordre) exception as such (§ 4). It is expected that Czech courts will interpret the notion of ordre public in line with § 36 of the old act that defined ordre public as “such principles of the social and state system of the Czech Republic and its law that are necessary to insist on unconditionally.” The old law did not contain provisions on overriding mandatory norms; the new act regulates them in § 3 (lex fori overriding mandatory norms) and in § 25 (foreign overriding mandatory norms). While § 3 in fact merely acknowledges the existence of lex fori provisions that are always applicable, § 25 dealing with third state overriding mandatory norms resembles to some extent controversial Article 7 para 1 of the Rome Convention. The new act also regulates circumvention (abuse) of law (§ 5) that may relate both to the conflict rules and the rules on jurisdiction. Characterisation should be usually made under Czech law (§ 20). Foreign law is to be ascertained and applied ex officio (§ 23).

Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments

As already suggested, the importance of the act lies in the areas outside the scope of the EU law and/or international conventions/agreements. In cases where neither the Brussels I regulation nor the Lugano Convention (or another international agreement) is applicable, jurisdiction in general civil and commercial matters will be governed by § 6 of the act. Under this provision Czech courts have international jurisdiction if they have local jurisdiction (venue) under the Czech Civil Procedure Code (see §§ 84-89a of the Civil Procedure Code – No. 99/1963 Coll.) – one of possible jurisdictional grounds under Czech law is, e.g., an asset location in the territory of the Czech Republic.

The recognition and enforcement of third state (non-EU, non-Lugano) judgments in general commercial and civil matters is governed by §§ 14-16. Apart from traditional grounds for the refusal of recognition (ordre public, res judicata, lis pendens, fair trial) there is mandatory requirement of (material) reciprocity for cases where the decision is against Czech citizen/entity. Also, for a third country judgment to be recognized in the Czech Republic the foreign court has to have jurisdiction under a base of jurisdiction under which Czech courts may assert jurisdiction, unless the defendant voluntarily submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction (see § 15 (1) a)).

Conflict rules and rules on jurisdiction in specific matters

In this part I will again mention especially those conflict rules and provisions on jurisdiction that fall outside the scope of the EU legislation.

The primary connecting factor for legal capacity of natural persons is place of habitual residence (§ 29 para 1). However, in case of a name the primary connecting factor is the citizenship with habitual place of residence being a subsidiary connecting factor (see § 29 para 3). Capacity and internal matters of legal entities are governed by the law of the place of incorporation (§ 30).

As the Czech Republic is not a party to 1978 Hague Convention on Agency, the act will be applicable to relations between the principal and third person (these matters fall outside the EU law, which is applicable to principal-agent and agent-third person relations). Apart from a general rule on agency with multiple connecting factors (§ 44), there is a special rule on „proxy“ (“die Prokura” in German) and similar specific types of agency (§ 45).

In the area of family law (§ 47 – 67) one might want to take a look at the conflict rule on divorces (§ 50), as the Czech Republic is not bound by the Rome III regulation. Property regimes of spouses shall be governed by the law of the state in which both spouses are habitually resident; otherwise by the law of the state of which both spouses are citizens; otherwise by the Czech law (§ 49 para 3). The conflict rules, rules on jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments in matters of establishment and contesting of parentage are contained in § 53-55. International adoption is governed by § 60-63, registered partnerships and similar unions by § 67.

In the area of rights in rem § 70 para 2 is especially worth noting; it brings about an important change compared to the previous law by assigning the transfer (creation and extinguishment) of ownership under the law governing the contract on the basis of which the ownership is being transferred. § 73 regulates conflict rules for trusts, including the recognition of foreign trusts in the territory of the Czech Republic; the applicable law is the law of the closest connection with the trust, unless the settlor selects the applicable law. Succession is governed by § 74-79, although the importance of these provisions will be largely diminished by the EU regulation on succession, (fully) coming into force in August 2015.

The field of obligations (§ 84 – 101) is largely covered, except for promissory notes and bills of exchange (§ 93 – 100), by the EU legislation. One of few provisions of the act from this area that should be fully applicable is § 101 on non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation. These shall be governed by the law of the state in which the violation (the act giving rise to damage) occurred, unless the injured person chooses one of (up to) three other laws the provision offers for choice.

Insolvency, arbitration and assistance from the Ministry of Justice

The act also deals with those aspects of international insolvency not covered by the EU Insolvency Regulation (§ 111). As regards applicable law, the act in principle extends the regime of the regulation also to the cases falling outside the regulation’s scope (§ 111 para 3). In cases not covered by the regulation, Czech courts may conduct insolvency proceedings if the debtor has an establishment in the Czech Republic provided it is requested by the creditor with habitual residence or seat in the Czech Republic or the creditor?s claim arose in connection with the establishment?s activities. They can also extend jurisdiction based on the regulation to the debtor’s assets in a foreign state other than a Member State of the European Union provided the foreign state attributes effects to the proceedings in its territory. Foreign judgments in the insolvency matters shall be recognized under the condition of reciprocity provided in a foreign state in which it was handed down the debtor has a centre of main interests and provided the debtor?s assets in the Czech Republic are not a subject of pending insolvency proceedings.

The arbitration matters are largely covered by international agreements to which the Czech Republic is a party, namely the New York Convention and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, thus the impact of the act is limited. Still, apart from the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (§120 – 122), the act also regulates the conditions under which a foreigner may be designated as arbitrator (§ 118). An admissibility of an arbitration agreement shall be assessed under the Czech law and its material validity shall be governed by the law of the state in which an arbitral award is to be issued.

Finally, there is one specific feature of the act worth mentioning: given the complexity of international matters the act provides an opportunity for courts to consult the Ministry of Justice in cases covered by the act (§ 110). It goes without saying that such a consultation is optional and the Ministry’s opinion is by no means binding upon the court.

Concluding remarks

I will not repeat my conclusion about the act from my post in Transactional Notes, instead I give you an opportunity to make your own conclusions about the act and its potential added value (not only practical but also in comparative perspective): in order to make the new act available to readers from around the world, my law firm has provided for the English translation of the act. You can download it free of charge via this link.

Those who would like to explore the act, its context and related case law may be interestedin the commentary I have co-authored together with my colleagues from the Ministry of Justice, Czech Supreme Court and a notary. Unfortunately, it is only in Czech; the same goesfor this commentary written by other team of authors.

Any comments or questions regarding the act or its translation are welcome either under the post or at petr.briza@brizatrubac.cz .