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quarta-feira, 25 de junho de 2014

Blog post: Polish Decisions on Submission to Jurisdiction

by GILLES CUNIBERTI on APRIL 22, 2014

by Michal Kocur and Jan Kieszczynski of Wozniak Kocur, a Polish litigationboutique law firm.

The Appellate Court in Lublin, Poland passed two separate decisions that stand by the principle that a challenge to international jurisdiction must be clear, substantiated and made right away in the defendant’s first appearance before the court.

In decisions taken on 26 March 2013 (file no. I ACz 151/13) and on 8 October 2013 (file no. I ACz746/13), the court found that raising a defense of lack of jurisdiction based on an arbitration clause cannot be treated as contesting the court’s international jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).

The decision is particularly noteworthy as it deals with a controversial issue, as yet undecided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).

Disputed jurisdiction

Both of the cases concerned the same dispute that emerged between two parties, a Polish and a French company, concerning the performance of a contract for the international sale of goods (Contract). The Polish company twice sued the French company for payment in the Polish courts. Both cases followed a similar pattern of procedural history, which will be outlined below.

In its statement of defense, the French company filed a motion to dismiss the case, taking the position that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the Contract. Apart from raising that jurisdictional defense, the defendant also went into the details of the merits of the case, rejecting the Polish company’s claim for payment. The Polish court rejected the French company’s jurisdictional defense. The court found that the arbitration agreement contained an exception that allowed the claimant to file a claim in a national court.

The French company appealed that decision. In its appeal, for the first time in the proceedings, the defendant raised a defense specifically invoking the lack of jurisdiction of Polish courts, and filed a motion to dismiss the case on those grounds. The defendant argued that the place of delivery of goods had changed, in light of which French courts had jurisdiction to hear the case, not Polish courts.

In response to the above, the claimant argued that the defendant’s challenge to the jurisdiction of Polish courts had not been presented in the statement of defense, and was therefore overdue.According to the claimant, as the Polish courts’ international jurisdiction was not contested in due time, the dispute was submitted to Polish courts in accordance with Article 24 Brussels I. Submission under Article 24 Brussels I exists when a defendant enters an appearance before the court, unless the appearance was entered in order to contest international jurisdiction:


Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Regulation, a court of a Member State before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.

The defendant disagreed. It argued that the statement of defense contained a jurisdictional defense based on the arbitration agreement, and that this defense alone was sufficient to properly contest international jurisdiction in the meaning of Article 24 Brussels I.

Inequality of objections

The issue whether raising an objection against jurisdiction based solely on an arbitration agreement is tantamount to contesting the jurisdiction of a Member State’s court has not yet been decided by the ECJ. The issue is controversial. In Poland, some scholars refer to a position presented in German language publications that a defense of the lack of jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement by the same token contests jurisdiction in the meaning of Article 24 Brussels I.

In both of the cases at hand, the Appellate Court in Lublin rejected the defendant’s view and found that it had international jurisdiction as the cases fell under the rule of submission to jurisdiction.

The court held that a jurisdictional defense based on an arbitration clause did not contest the Polish courts’ international jurisdiction in the meaning of Article 24 Brussels I. According to the court, the defendant’s properly contested international jurisdiction too late and by that time the cases must have been treated as having been submitted. In the written reasons of the decisions, the court stated that a challenge against jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement and a challenge against international jurisdiction are two separate challenges. It is not possible to assume that raising a defense of lack of jurisdiction due to an arbitration agreement is effective with regard to international jurisdiction.

The Appellate Court’s decision was correct. An objection to jurisdiction based on an arbitration agreement and an objection to international jurisdiction are based on different legal and factual grounds. This is exemplified by the case at hand. The lack of jurisdiction due to the arbitration agreement was claimed under the provisions of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, and the dispute centered around the interpretation of the arbitration clause. The defense of lack of international jurisdiction was made under the provisions of Brussels I and on the basis of a disputed place of delivery of the goods. If different facts and different legal provisions have to be presented to substantiate either of the two defenses, one cannot treat them as synonymous in their effect.

Importance of submission

The analyzed decision of the Appellate Court in Lublin is also in line with the rules of examining jurisdiction enshrined in Brussels I.

Brussels I provides for an examination of the jurisdiction by the court’s own motion only in exceptional situations. That is the case, for example, in Article 22 point 1, which provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in which a property is situated in cases concerning rights in rem in immovable property. Apart from such exceptions, the court only examines its jurisdiction if the jurisdiction is challenged by the defendant. Such challenges must be properly substantiated and raised in the first appearance before the court, i.e. usually, in the statement of defense.

This principle is interconnected with another rule, namely, the rule of submission of jurisdiction if no challenge is made by the defendant at the beginning of proceedings.

Both of the rules make perfect sense, both from the perspective of case management and legal certainty. If the courts were to examine jurisdiction by their own motion at every stage of the case, jurisdiction could be questioned very late in the proceedings, even before the court of last instance. That would lead to the obstruction of justice and deprive the parties of the right to have their case decided in due time.

Finding identity between a jurisdictional defense based on an arbitration agreement and a defense of lack of international jurisdiction would be contrary to the above rules. It would demand from the court to examine a challenge based on an arbitration agreement way beyond the legal reasoning and facts presented in that challenge. In such a case, if the court decided that the challenge based on an arbitration agreement should be dismissed, then the court would have to examine whether it has international jurisdiction, essentially, by its own motion. It would be the court that would be obliged to establish whether there were any other circumstances, apart from the arbitration agreement, that could potentially affect its jurisdiction to hear the case. This would not be a reasonable solution. Instead, the Brussels I rules discipline the parties to promptly decide whether they question the international jurisdiction of the court where they have been summoned. Those rules also prohibit them from second-guessing their jurisdictional defenses.


segunda-feira, 23 de junho de 2014

Article: The French Twitter Case: A Difficult Equilibrium between Freedom of Expression and its Limits

European University Institute

November 01, 2013

Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, vol. 10, pp. 193-197 

Abstract:

The French Twitter case (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de référé, 24 janv. 2013, n° 13/50262, n° 13/50276, UEJF et a. c/ Twitter Inc. et Sté Twitter France and Cour d’Appel de Paris, 12 June 2013, Twitter Inc. et Twitter France c/ UEJF et a.) shows the difficulties experienced by courts, national authorities and companies, in relation to an international activity, and to find an equilibrium between freedom of expression and its limits, notably in the respect of public order. Moreover, it also shows that in a significant number of cases on the Internet, the application of the French law depends on the goodwill of the companies or the authorities of a foreign state.

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414609>. Acesso em 10 abr. 2014.

sexta-feira, 20 de junho de 2014

Article: Isaiah Berlin's Neglect of Enlightenment Constitutionalism

New York University School of Law; University of Oxford

March 17, 2014

Abstract:

One of the most important achievements of the Enlightenment is what I shall call Enlightenment constitutionalism. It transformed our political thinking out of all recognition; it left, as its legacy, not just the repudiation of monarchy and nobility in France in the 1790s but the unprecedented achievement of the framing, ratification, and establishment of the Constitution of the United States. It comprised the work of Diderot, Kant, Locke, Madison, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Sieyes, and Voltaire. It established the idea of a constitution as an intricate mechanism designed to house the untidiness and pluralism of human politics. 

Yet Isaiah Berlin, supposedly one of our greatest interpreters of the Enlightenment, said almost nothing about it. The paper develops this claim and it speculates as to why this might be so. Certainly one result of Berlin's sidelining of Enlightenment constitutionalism is to lend spurious credibility to his well-known claim that Enlightenment social design was perfectionist, monastic, and potentially totalitarian. By ignoring Enlightenment constitutionalism, Berlin implicitly directed us away from precisely the body of work that might have refuted this view of Enlightenment social design.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2410388>. Acesso em 3 abr. 2014.

quarta-feira, 18 de junho de 2014

Article: Top Five Things to Look for in a Legal Job: People, Tasks, Case/Project Features, Demands & Rewards

University of Washington - School of Law

University of Washington School of Law

March 4, 2014

Abstract:

Law students and new lawyers often struggle to find their place in the legal profession. Too often, they assume that their job search should be driven by subject matter. "I enjoyed my contracts class, so perhaps I'd enjoy working on contracts." This article advises law students to reorient their focus away from substantive law toward this top five things to look for in a legal job: people, tasks, case or project features, demands and rewards. Within each category, advises prospective lawyers on how different legal jobs may vary.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 8

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404627>. Acesso em 3 abr. 2014.

segunda-feira, 16 de junho de 2014

Article: No Shoehorn Required: How a Required, Three-Year, Persuasion-Based Legal Writing Program Easily Fits within the Broader Law School Curriculum

Indiana Tech Law School

Indiana Tech Law School

March 2014

Abstract:

In prior articles, we advocated for a required fifteen-credit, three-year, persuasion-based, linear legal writing curriculum. Our model begins with persuasive advocacy from the first day of law school, and takes a sequential approach that mirrors the practice of law — from the initial client meeting to the appellate brief. It includes a separate track for those interested in transactional work, incorporates alternative dispute resolution and settlement simulations, and involves students in researching and drafting amicus briefs before federal appellate courts. Students are also offered several electives each semester to complement their required course load, and receive intense training in narrative storytelling, re-writing, and editing. In this article, we incorporate our proposal into the broader curricular context, and argue for more separation, not more integration, among the analytical, practical, and experiential pillars of legal education. All three are indispensable — and independent — pillars of real-world legal education: (1) the analytical focuses on critical thinking; (2) legal writing combines — and refines — thinking through practical skills training; and (3) experiential learning involves students in the practice of law. To help law students master all three, the curriculum should be designed in a largely sequential (although sometimes concurrent) order, to embrace, not blur, their substantive differences, and to approach inter-foundational collaboration with caution. Broadly speaking, analytical training should dominate the first year in legal writing, but should include an experiential component. The second year should combine analytical and practical skills training, and the third year should focus extensively on clinical work. Of course, a linear approach is not necessarily the best or most effective way to incorporate more writing classes into the curriculum. But three years of required legal writing, however structured, will likely benefit law students and the legal profession. As a recent article in the Wall Street Journal reported, college graduates “lack writing skills,” in part because “schools are not placing sufficient emphasis on writing and grammar.” Coupled with the substantial criticism from lawyers and judges about recent graduates’ weak writing skills, this places a high burden on law schools to focus more extensively on writing, composition, and legal drafting. That takes time — certainly more than a year.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2403968>. Acesso em 3 abr. 2014.

sexta-feira, 13 de junho de 2014

Article: Direct Participation: Law School Clinics and International Humanitarian Law

Emory University School of Law

University of California, Irvine School of Law

March 1, 2014

International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 892 (2014) 

Abstract:

This article describes and analyzes two law school clinics focused on international humanitarian law: the International Humanitarian Law Clinic at Emory Law School and the International Justice Clinic at University of California, Irvine School of Law. Law school clinics focused on international humanitarian law enable students to participate directly in the development and application of IHL in concrete ‘real world’ settings – from training to research and fact-finding, litigation to high-level advocacy, and many spaces in between. These opportunities do far more than contribute only to these students’ development as effective, reflective lawyers, certainly a key goal of any clinical environment. Clinical IHL work also matches clinical pedagogy with cutting-edge issues in armed conflict to deepen students’ law school experiences and enables them to engage in the IHL goals of promotion, implementation and enforcement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2403303>. Acesso em 3 abr. 2014.


quarta-feira, 11 de junho de 2014

Article: Boilerplate Shock

University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Harvard Law School

March 3, 2014


Abstract:

No nation was spared in the recent global downturn, but several Eurozone countries arguably were hit the hardest. Doubts about the solvency of Greece, Spain, and some of their neighbors are making it more likely that the euro will break up. Observers fear a single departure and sovereign debt default might set off a “bank run” on the common European currency, with devastating consequences.

What mechanisms are available to address — or ideally, to prevent — such a disaster?

One unlikely candidate is boilerplate language in the contracts that govern sovereign bonds. These are provisions that have not been given a great deal of thought, yet they have the potential to be a powerful tool in confronting the threat of a global economic conflagration — or in fanning the flames.

Scholars currently believe that a country departing the Eurozone could convert its debt obligations to a new currency, thereby rendering its debt burden manageable and staving off default. However, this Article argues that these boilerplate terms — specifically, clauses specifying the law that governs the bond and the currency in which it will be paid — would likely prevent such a result. Instead, the courts most likely to interpret these terms would probably declare a departing country’s effort to repay a sovereign bond in its new currency a default.

A default would inflict damage far beyond the immediate parties. Not only would it surprise the markets, it would be taken to predict the future of other struggling European countries’ debt obligations, because they are largely governed by the same boilerplate terms. The possibility of such a result therefore increases the risk that a single nation’s departure from the euro might bring down the currency and trigger a global meltdown.

To mitigate this risk, this Article proposes a new rule of contract interpretation that would allow a sovereign bond to be paid in the borrower’s new currency under certain circumstances. It also introduces the phrase “boilerplate shock” to describe the potential for standardized contract terms to transform an isolated default on a single contract into a threat to the broader economy. Beyond the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone, the Article urges that lawyers address the potential for boilerplate shock in securities markets to damage the global economy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 77

Disponível em: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2403695>. Acesso em 3 abr. 2014.

terça-feira, 10 de junho de 2014

Journal - Public International Law: Sources eJournal, v. 1, n. 10, May 29, 2014

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOURCES eJOURNAL
Vol. 1, No. 10: May 29, 2014

ALAN O'NEIL SYKES, EDITOR
Robert Kindler Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
alan.sykes@nyu.edu

Table of Contents

Law, Legal Systems, and Legal Families
Surendra Bhandari, Ritsumeikan University - College of International Relations

The Swiss Vote Against Mass Immigration and International Law: A Preliminary Assessment
Vincent Chetail, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEI)

Harmonisation of IP Treaties - An Analytical Approach
Somnath De, Symbiosis Law School, Pune
Nandini Jaiswal, Symbiosis International University - Symbiosis Law School, Pune

Rules of Engagement and Abusive Citizens
Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

Secondary Liability for Online Trademark Infringement: The International Landscape
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Weak Right, Strong Court - The Freedom to Conduct Business and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
Xavier Groussot, Lund University - Faculty of Law
Gunnar Thor Petursson, Reykjavik University
Justin Pierce, Lund University - Faculty of Law

Alternative Views on the European Union: Which Institutional Architecture?
Sergio Fabbrini, Luiss School of Government

India and Bilateral Investment Treaties -- A Changing Landscape
Prabhash Ranjan, South Asian University

Transposition of EU Directives into the Romanian Legal Order. Principles of the European Union Law and Romanian Experiences
Marian Enache, Independent

Una Aproximación Internacionalprivatista Al Nuevo CPC De Bolivia, De 2013 (A Private International Law Approach to the New Code of Civil Procedure of Bolivia of 2013)
Carlos Esplugues, University of Valencia - Faculty of Law